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FROM THE LIGHTHOUSES: HOW THE FIRST FEDERAL INTERNAL 
IMPROVEMENT PROJECTS CREATED PRECEDENT THAT BROADENED THE 
COMMERCE CLAUSE, SHRUNK THE TAKINGS CLAUSE, AND AFFECTED EARLY 
NINETEENTH CENTURY CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE
Adam S. Grace*
I will not go to a dictionary for the meaning 
of the word “regulate.”  I will go to the 
history of legislation, commencing with the 
foundation of this Government, and continued 
without interruption or objection, on 
constitutional principles, down to this day, to 
prove what the undoubted right of Congress, 
under the power in question, is.
Rep. Jacob C. Isacks 
(Mar. 24, 1830)1
[The power to take private property] only 
appears a little novel, because we are not 
familiarized to it.
Rep. Joseph Hemphill 
(Jan. 14, 1823)2
INTRODUCTION
In the first few decades of the nineteenth century, pages and pages 
of the Annals of Congress and Register of Debates were filled with repeated 
debates over the constitutionality of federally-sponsored internal 
improvement projects—projects intended to facilitate commerce through 
*
 Acting Assistant Professor, New York University School of Law, Lawyering 
Department.  Thanks to Larry Kramer for his encouragement and invaluable advice, to 
William Nelson for his helpful comments on an earlier draft, and to William Treanor for 
his thoughtful suggestions on an earlier draft of the eminent domain section.  Thanks also 
to Johnisha Matthews for her excellent work gathering Tonnage Act materials, to the First 
Federal Congress Project for their assistance and hospitality, and to the archivists at NARA 
and the state archives of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, 
Rhode Island, and South Carolina, who provided significant expert assistance in tracking 
down needed documents.  Finally, special thanks to Lisanne Renner for her 
encouragement.    
1
 6 Reg. Deb. 662 (1830).
2
 40 Annals of Cong. 622 (1823).
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improved transportation.3  Among other topics, Congressmen fought over 
whether the power to “regulate” commerce included the power to 
“facilitate” commerce by constructing roads and canals.4  And the existence 
of a federal eminent domain power (potentially necessary to bring such 
projects to fruition) was also questioned during these debates.5
The quotes above come from two such internal improvement 
debates.  At the time the statements were made, Congress was not debating 
on a clean slate.  Or rather, the slate was only one-third clean.  Though a 
question of crucial importance to the development of the country, whether 
or not the Constitution empowered the federal government to create internal 
improvements never reached federal court.6  But the slate did contain the 
prior constitutional interpretations (or constructions) of the other two 
branches of government.  It was that slate—the “history of legislation”—
that Tennessee’s Jacob Isacks was consulting instead of the dictionary, in 
searching for constitutional meaning.  Isacks’ comment is a window to a 
key aspect of the debate he and his colleagues were engaged in:  whether 
Congress could rely on legislative precedent (over the dictionary, even) as 
conclusive of how the Constitution was to be interpreted.
The dominant twentieth and twenty-first century conception of the 
balance of powers places the power of constitutional interpretation squarely 
within the province of the judiciary.7  However, recent scholarship, 
particularly by Larry D. Kramer, has argued for a revival of the legislature’s 
3
 “Internal improvements” was the phrase then used to refer to transportation projects.  
Harry N. Scheiber, The Transportation Revolution and American Law:  Constitutionalism 
and Public Policy, in Transportation and the Early Nation 1, 1 (1982).  In the 1780s, the 
phrase was used loosely to refer to a variety of programs aimed at encouraging the new 
nation’s “security, prosperity, and enlightenment,” but the concept eventually narrowed 
until it became “synonymous with public works for improved transportation.”  John Lauritz 
Larson, Internal Improvement 3 (2001).  
4
 Other powers were often cited to justify construction of internal improvements, such 
as the power to establish postal routes, the power to conduct military affairs, or the power 
to spend for the nation’s general welfare, but my focus here is on how early Congresses 
debated and constructed federal authority under the Commerce Clause.  
A sense of the difficulty of the “internal improvements” question can be gleaned from 
the fact that Justice Story, in his Commentaries on the Constitution, was unwilling to opine 
on whether the Constitution empowered the federal government to construct roads and 
canals and improve the navigation of watercourses.  Joseph Story, Commentaries on the 
Constitution of the United States, vol. II at 162-65 (3d ed. 1858)(saying that “the reader 
must decide for himself upon his own views of the subject”).
5
 For a discussion of eminent domain, see infra at ___.
6
 Harry N. Scheiber, The Transportation Revolution and American Law:  
Constitutionalism and Public Policy, in Transportation and the Early Nation 1, 3 (1982).
7
 Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves:  Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial 
Review 8 (forthcoming).
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historical role in determining constitutional meaning,8 and the proper roles 
of court and legislature in constitutional interpretation are very much in 
debate today.9
But rather than entering that debate, let us return instead to the 
internal improvement debates of the early nineteenth century.  In doing so, 
we find much strongly worded dissent from Mr. Isacks’ view that Congress 
could rely on legislative precedent to impart meaning to words in the 
Constitution when the dictionary may have suggested otherwise.10  The 
issue was not just one of balance of powers (whether Congress, rather than 
the Court, could impart meaning to the Constitution).  Central to the debate 
was whether legislative precedent could be given weight in any 
constitutional interpretation.  It is a question that goes to the heart of the 
nature of our Constitution.
As John Reid has shown, the concept of constitutional law being 
built on custom was a part of 18th-century jurisprudence.11  Just as rights 
8 Id. at 176-92; Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court?  The Fall of the 
Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 Col. L. Rev. 237, 
319-30 (2002); Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Construction 1-3 (1999); Barry 
Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1,  n.271 
and accompanying text (Nov. 1998).
9 See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler & Michael C. Dorf, Constitutional Existence 
Conditions and Judicial Review, in Marbury v. Madison:  A Bicentennial Symposium, 89 
Va. L. Rev. 1106 (Oct. 2003); L.A. Powe, Jr., The Politics of American Judicial Review:  
Reflections on the Marshall, Warren and Rehnquist Courts, in Judicial Review: Blessing 
or Curse?  Or Both?  A Symposium in Commemoration of the Bicentennial of Marbury v. 
Madison, 38 Wake Forest L. Rev. 697 (Oct. 2003).  The Supreme Court’s recent 
Commerce Clause trilogy (United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Printz v. 
United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)) has also 
fueled the debate. 
10 See, infra, ___.  Research by Michele L. Landis has found that reliance on 
precedent played a significant role in early Congressional provision of disaster relief.  
Those early legislative acts bear a quasi-judicial stamp (in Landis’ words, Congress was 
acting more like a court than a legislature in handling requests for relief), and 
Congressional debaters often argued either that precedent must be followed to ensure that 
analogous cases would be treated equally, or that a particular petition should be denied for 
fear of creating additional precedent.  Though some argued against the binding nature of 
precedent, by the late 1820s many members in Congress felt bound by prior actions to 
entertain (and pay) federal claims for relief under similar circumstances.  See Michele L. 
Landis, “Let Me Next Time Be ‘Tried by Fire’”:  Disaster Relief and the Origins of the 
American Welfare State 1789-1874, 92 Nw. L. Rev. 967, 1003, 1009-11, 1015-16 (Spring 
1998); Michele L. Landis, Fate, Responsibility, and “Natural” Disaster Relief:  Narrating 
the American Welfare State, 33 Law & Soc. Rev. 257, 268-70 (1999).   
11
  John Philip Reid, The Authority to Legislate 153 (1986); Kramer, The People 
Themselves 22-28 (discussing 18th century view that Constitution could be amended by 
precedent).  See also Kramer at 261-76 (discussing early nineteenth century shift in 
4 Adam Grace [18-Mar-04]
could be established by customary practice, the dangerous flipside was that 
any innovation in the law could become “mutated from an aberration into a 
precedent.”12  In Reid’s words, the creation of precedent was the “ultimate 
constitutional risk,” because through it the unconstitutional could be 
converted into the constitutional.13  The internal improvement debates of the 
early nineteenth century provide a rich example of a debate over whether 
earlier conceptions of a customary constitution still held sway.  Did 
legislators of the period believe that prior unopposed legislative practices 
could be deemed precedent that would provide meaning to an evolving 
Constitution, or did they believe that reliance on such precedent was 
unconstitutional because it could potentially amend the fixed words of the 
Constitution outside the established amendment mechanism?14
In arguing that legislative precedent established Congress’ 
“undoubted right” under the Commerce Clause, Representative Isacks was 
harkening back to the then longstanding federal practice of building one 
particular type of internal improvements:  lighthouses and similar 
navigational aids.15  In fact, despite the slow evolution of the federal 
internal improvement program, the power to build lighthouses was 
established within the first five months of the First Federal Congress.16
From that early date forward, the power to “regulate” (i.e. facilitate) 
commerce by constructing such navigational aids was continuously 
exercised without serious challenge.  And just as routinely, federal 
thinking of Constitution similarly to ordinary law).
12
   Reid, The Authority to Legislate at 157-58.
13 Id. at 158.
14
  Supreme Court practice during the same period has been characterized as enforcing 
the “original meaning” of the Constitution, based on an understanding that such meaning 
was “fixed” and could only be changed by formal amendment.  See Howard Gillman, “The 
Collapse of Constitutional Originalism and the Rise of the Notion of the ‘Living 
Constitution’ in the Course of American State-Building,” 11 Studies in Am. Pol. Devel. 
191, 192, 194, 198-204 (Fall 1997).  But compare id.at 204 (interpreting Justice Marshall’s 
decision in M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819), as consistent with a fixed original 
understanding of the scope of federal power) with H. Jefferson Powell, “The Original 
Understanding of Original Intent,” 98 Harv. L. Rev.  905, 940-44 (1984-85) (saying that 
Justice Marshall shared Madison’s acceptance of the authority of precedent). See also
Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 519, 525-29
(2003) (discussing Madison’s conception of constitutional meaning being “liquidated” or 
“settled” over time through precedents); David A. Strauss, Common Law, Common 
Ground, and Jefferson’s Principle, 112 Yale L.J. 1717 (May 2003) (setting forth a modern 
theory of “common law” constitutional interpretation).  
15
 “It has been the work of every year to make harbors, build custom-houses, 
warehouses, seawalls, light-houses, and do every thing which the convenience of external 
trade requires.”  6 Reg. Deb. 662 (1830).
16 See Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 53 (the “Lighthouse Act”).
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lighthouse construction was relied on as a helpful analogous precedent by 
Congressmen arguing in favor of a broader power to construct roads and 
canals.17
Whenever Congress debated the legal weight to be given to 
Commerce Clause precedents, construction of lighthouses and related 
navigational aids was always a factor in the discussion.  In fact, the birth of 
the federal lighthouse system provides an excellent example of the power 
that legislative precedent—or the lack of such precedent—had over the 
development of constitutional interpretation in the early republic.  
In 1789, when the First Federal Congress first sat, it would not have 
been clear to everyone that (1) the federal government had the power to 
construct lighthouses; and (2) that the power to “regulate” commerce 
included the power to “facilitate” commerce by constructing such internal 
improvements.  Nevertheless, the Commerce Clause precedent created by 
the Lighthouse Act remained virtually unquestioned even while the power 
to “construct” improvements and “facilitate” commerce would be debated 
for decades in relation to proposed road and canal programs.  Whether the 
lighthouse precedent was to be accorded broader application was heavily 
debated.  But the precedent of federal lighthouse building was never turned 
back.
In the first half of Part I, I explain how the Commerce Clause was 
expanded so quickly to encompass federal lighthouse operation.  As it turns 
out, the federal government’s swift entry into questionable constitutional 
waters did not occur because the First Federal Congress arrived at a 
principled interpretation of the Commerce Clause, to be applied in all 
analogous situations.  Rather, the federal government took up this one type 
of internal improvement so rapidly because of narrow considerations 
stemming from the newly-imposed federal tax policy.  With the new federal 
government collecting the specific type of duties previously relied upon by 
states to maintain their lighthouses (“tonnage duties”), political 
considerations were greatly aided by an interpretation of the Commerce 
Clause that justified creation of a federal lighthouse system.     
17 See, infra, ___.  A typical example is this argument by Massachusetts’ Timothy 
Pickering, made thirteen years before Isacks’ remarks:  “[C]ommerce (which consisted in 
the exchange of commodities) was carried on by land, as well as by water; and if Congress, 
under the clause for regulating commerce, could rightfully do, what, from the formation of 
the Government, they had been doing and without a single objection—erecting light-
houses, beacons, and piers, to give facility and safety to commerce by water; why should 
they not exercise the like power to facilitate, secure and render less expensive by means of 
roads and canals, the commerce by land?”  30 Annals of Cong. 859 (1817). 
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In the second half of Part I, I show how the precedent of lighthouse 
building was relied in during the internal improvement debates, and how 
interpretations of the Commerce Clause were affected by such legislative 
precedent.  In sum, subsequent Congressional debate shows that although 
the Lighthouse Act was enacted before it would have been widely accepted 
that the power to “regulate” under the Commerce Clause included the 
power to “facilitate” commerce (and for reasons related to the nexus 
between lighthouses and federal tonnage policy), the legislative precedent 
for lighthouses became solidified as a valid Constitutional interpretation.
In Part II, I examine the eminent domain issue raised by the second 
quote provided at the beginning of this article.  The federal government’s 
power to take private property was not confirmed by the Supreme Court 
until the 1870s.  The accepted historiography holds that the federal 
government did not exercise its eminent domain powers until that late date 
because of doubts that the power existed.  However, the history of the 
federal lighthouse program in the 1790s suggests the need for 
reconsideration of the accepted eminent domain historiography.  In brief, 
there is evidence that the early administrators of the lighthouse program 
were more prepared than previously assumed to exercise federal takings 
power—and that the delay in solidification of a federal eminent domain 
power occurred not because of doubts that existed right after the founding, 
but rather because the use of the power never took hold as precedent for
other reasons.  As explained in Part II, early exercise of the power 
combined federal acquisition of title (which did not require state consent) 
with acquisition of jurisdiction (which did require state consent), and later 
politicians blurred the two concepts together in arguing that the federal 
government lacked the power to take title without state consent.  
  In other words, an examination of the birth of the federal 
lighthouse system shows us both sides of the power that non-judicially 
created precedent could hold in the early republic.  Because lighthouses 
were routinely constructed, the interpretation of the Commerce Clause 
followed suit.  But because the federal government had not routinely and 
clearly exercised its powers to condemn property without any state 
involvement, federal takings power shrunk, even though earlier 
understandings of the Constitution could have supported its exercise.
We turn now to an examination of how the federal lighthouse 
system created Commerce Clause precedent in the first months of the First 
Federal Congress.
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I.  FEDERALIZATION OF LIGHTHOUSES AND THE CREATION OF LEGISLATIVE 
PRECEDENT UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
A.  How federal tax policy led to the establishment of Commerce Clause 
Precedent in the first five months of the First Federal Congress
In a world with speedy land and air transportation, and sophisticated 
navigation systems, it is easy to forget how important lighthouses were to 
our eighteenth century predecessors.  But when the First Federal Congress 
first sat in March 1789, a dozen or so (now quaint, to us) pillars with lamps 
guided the way over the nation’s most significant commercial routes.18  All 
of them had been put there by the individual colonial and state 
governments.19  In assessing whether the framers or ratifying conventions of 
the Constitution would have anticipated the new federal government 
immediately supplanting the state governments’ role in erecting and 
maintaining them,   three facts are worth noting:
At the Constitutional Convention, the question of federal control 
over lighthouses was not debated.  Delegate James McHenry considered 
making a motion to provide for such power, but on the last day of debate—
the day after the convention rejected a motion by Benjamin Franklin for a 
grant of power to cut canals—McHenry’s Maryland delegation moved 
instead for a clause preventing Congress from restraining States from laying 
“duties of tonnage” for erecting lighthouses and clearing harbors.20  In 
response to the motion, the convention decided to treat tonnage duties the 
same way imposts and duties on imports and exports were treated; states 
would be restricted from laying them without the consent of Congress.21
Thus, the Constitution left a significant potential lighthouse funding 
18
 See Dennis L. Noble, Lighthouses & Keepers 5 (noting that colonial lighthouses 
were erected near important ports of trade).  Decades later, water travel was still superior to 
overland commercial routes. 
19
 Francis Ross Holland, Jr., America’s Lighthouses:  An Illustrated History 8-12, 69-
80 (1988).  Prior to 1789, the national government expended no monies for erecting or 
repairing lighthouses or navigational aids.  American State Papers, Vol. 2, Ser. 15, No. 235 
(Expenditures for Surveying the Seacoast, Bays, &c, and for the Lighthouse Establishment, 
communicated to the Senate, Nov. 17, 1820).  That can be contrasted with the interstate 
postal system, which a 1982 Congressional ordinance dubbed “essentially requisite to the 
safety as well as the commercial interest” of the United States, and into which the 
Contintental Congress had poured over $150,000 in order to keep it afloat.  Journals of the 
Continental Congress at 670 (Fri. Oct. 18, 1782); Wayne E. Fuller, The American Mail 36 
(1972).
20
 Max Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, Vol. II at 504 
(McHenry) (1911); id. at 615 (Madison), 625 (Madison), and 633 (McHenry).  Tonnage 
duties were traditionally used to fund lighthouse operations.  See, infra, at __. 
21 Id. at 624-26 (Madison), 633-34 (McHenry).
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mechanisms to subsequent political resolution, and said nothing explicitly 
one way or the other regarding state or federal power to construct and 
operate lighthouses.
Second, during the ratification period, both federalists and anti-
federalists argued from the position that the federal government would lack 
power over building lighthouses and other forms of internal improvements.  
Federalists assured a wary public that the federal government would not 
interfere with such traditional state operations.22  Anti-federalists decried 
the fact that the Constitution left the states nothing more than that.23  The 
anti-federalist concern was not that Congress would start building 
transportation-related projects, but that it might interfere with the states’ 
own projects by virtue of its broad power over critical sources of funding 
(i.e. taxes).24
Third, throughout the ratification period—and even while Congress 
was first sitting—states continued to plan and construct new lighthouses, in 
addition to maintaining the existing structures.25  That is not to say that the 
state-run system was without problems.  But in 1789, the state-built 
lighthouse system was functional and in the capable hands of state-
appointed caretakers.26
22
 XV Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution, Commentaries on 
the Constitution, Public and Private, Vol. 3 at 453, 457-8 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 
1984) [Number 472, “A Freeman I,” Pennsylvania Gazette, 23 January, 1788]; id. at 508, 
510 [Number 488, A Freeman II, Pennsylvania Gazette, 30 January, 1788]. 
23
  In Patrick Henry’s words to the Virginia ratification convention, “What shall the 
states have to do?  Take care of the poor, repair and make highways, erect bridges, and so 
on, and so on?  Abolish the state legislatures at once.  What purposes should they be 
continued for?  Our legislature will indeed be a ludicrous spectacle….”  3 Elliot’s Debates 
171 (June 9, 1788).
24
 XVII Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution, Commentaries on 
the Constitution, Public and Private, Vol. 5 at 133, 142 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1995) 
[Number 688, “A Farmer,” Philadelphia Freeman’s Journal, 16, 23 April 1788].
25 See, e.g., Acts and Laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (publ. 1893), 
1787—Ch. 21 (p.577) and 1787—Ch. 31 (p.595); Acts and Laws of the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts (publ. 1894), 1789—Resolves, Ch. 131 (p.600); Hennings—1787, Ch. I, 
section XXII (p.428), Ch. IV, section XV (p.442), section XXXI (p.445); Contract between 
the Commissioners of the Navigation of Cape Fear and Matthew Lyall, dated May 28, 
1788, located in Record Group 26 of the National Archives, 17G, Box 1; William 
Campbell, Benjamin Smith, Henry Toomer, George Hooper, M. R. Willkings, Auly 
Macnaughten, and Thomas Withers to Alexander Hamilton, Sept. 5, 1791 (reprinted in IX 
Syrett 173) (stating that construction began in 1788, and describing plan and state of Cape 
Fear lighthouse); David Stick, Bald Head:  A History of Smith Island and Cape Fear 32 
(1985) (concluding that state did most of the work on the Cape Fear lighthouse); XXV The 
State Records of North Carolina (Walter Clark, ed.) 54 (1906) (Ch. 58 of 1789 laws, 
providing for erection of lighthouse on “Ocacock Island”). 
26
 Report of Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, June 18, 1790 (providing 
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Given that background, why did the dramatic change from state to 
federal control over these key pieces of state-owned infrastructure occur so 
quickly in the early days of the First Federal Congress?  It was not because 
of a shared majority conception of the new government’s broad role in 
internal improvement projects.  Rather, the expansion of federal power 
grew out of a conflict between typical state funding mechanisms for 
lighthouses and Congress’ exercise of its new taxation powers.  
Prior to 1789, a primary source of funds for constructing, 
maintaining, and operating lighthouses had customarily been the assessment 
of “tonnage duties” (or “light money”) on ships that came into port.27  The 
Constitution gave the federal government the power to assess tonnage 
duties, and (as noted above) provided that states could not lay such duties 
without federal consent.  As a general matter, of course, the more taxes the 
federal government collected, the fewer the resources left in state hands for 
any state-run projects.  But with lighthouses there was additionally a 
specific link between a particular type of tax and the projects traditionally 
funded by that tax.  It is that link that brought the Commerce Clause issue to 
the fore so quickly:  If the federal government collected tonnage duties 
rather than consenting to state assessed duties, what would happen to the 
states’ lighthouses?  Could the federal government constitutionally take 
control of them?  These are the questions that arose as soon as Congress sat 
down to discuss the issue of tonnage.    
1. The Tonnage Act Debate:  How Constitutional and Political
Issues Regarding Federal Operation of Lighthouses Were 
Effectively Resolved Before They Had Been Fully Debated   
[If the Constitution] had in view institution of 
lighthouses and other things, [it] might have 
favorable summary of the present condition of the lighthouses, and stating that the prior 
state-appointed keepers have been recommended as proper to be continued).
27
 The following are examples of state light money statutes:  Leonard Woods Laberee,
ed., The Public Records of the State of Connecticut from May, 1785, through January, 
1789 22 (1945); XIX, Pt. 2 Colonial Records of the State of Georgia 476, 479 (1911); 
XXV State Records of North Carolina (Walter Clark, ed.) 54-55 (1906); N.H. Act of Apr. 
16, 1784; XII Statutes at Large [Virginia] (William Hening, ed.) 304, 305 (1823); X 
Records of the State of Rhode Island (John Russell Bartlett, ed.)105 (1865); Acts and Laws 
of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts 1782-83 at 543 (1890).  
    Though lotteries and general revenues were also used for lighthouse construction, 
light money was (in addition to being an important source of funds for construction) the 
major source of funds for ongoing operational and maintenance costs.  See id.; George R. 
Putnam, Lighthouses and Lightships of the United States 1, 4-6, 11, 15, 18, 22 (1933); 
Edward Rowe Snow, The Lighthouses of New England 1716-1973 at 322 (1973).
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given [Congress] this power by introducing 
few words.”
Rep. Theodorick Bland, 
during the tonnage debate28
Revenue was the new government’s primary need.  And so, after a 
month of waiting for congressmen to arrive, and a week spent ironing out 
procedural matters, the House got down to business in early April 1789, 
with James Madison introducing an impost and tonnage resolution in order 
to cure “the deficiencies of the federal treasury.”29  The main goal was 
generating revenue, but by including tonnage duties in his resolution, 
Madison also intended to address another need:  use of Congress’ taxation 
and regulatory powers to bolster American commerce by addressing power 
disparities the individual states had faced in their competition with foreign 
shipping.  
Accordingly, the draft resolution set forth (with blanks for the 
amounts yet to be debated) a protectionist schedule of separate tonnage 
duties for American vessels, foreign vessels, and foreign vessels from 
countries with whom the United States had treaties.30  The inability of the 
states to respond as a unified group to other nations’ harmful foreign trade 
policies had been a significant problem during the Confederation, and 
Madison’s resolution was intended to achieve a national tonnage policy of 
“discrimination” against foreign vessels.31
The reaction to Madison’s introduction of the discriminatory 
tonnage issue was swift.  South Carolina’s Thomas Tudor Tucker, 
representing a state whose merchants relied heavily on British shipping, 
immediately voiced his objection, asking that discussion of the matter be 
28
 X Documentary History of the First Federal Congress of the United States of 
America (Bickford, Bowling, and Veit eds.) [“DHOFFC”] 395 (May 4, 1789) (Lloyd’s 
Notes, 4 May).
29 Id. at 1-2 (Apr. 8, 1789) (The Daily Advertiser, 9 Apr. 1789).
30 Id. at 2.  
31
 As reported in the Daily Advertiser, Madison explicitly stated that the subject of his 
resolution “might be considered in two points of light.  First as it respected only the 
regulation of commerce.  Secondly as to revenue.”  Id. at 1.  “Regulation” refers to the 
impact that the various imposts and tonnage duties would have on commerce related to the 
targeted items and vessels.  See, e.g., James Madison to Jos. C. Cabell, Esq., Sept. 18, 
1828, reprinted as Madison on the Tariff, Letter 1, in 4 Elliot’s Debates 600, 601, 604 
(stating that the power to regulate trade with foreign nations “embraces the object of 
encouraging by duties, restrictions, and prohibitions, the manufactures and products of the 
country;” and describing Virginia’s pre-convention view that uniformity of commercial 
regulations was needed between the states and foreign nations); Jeffrey T. Renz, What 
Spending Clause?  (Or the President’s Paramour), 33 J. Marshall L. Rev. 81, 88-94 (1999) 
(discussing Congress’ power to levy duties for either revenue or regulatory purposes).
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deferred until additional representatives were present.32  The motion 
succeeded and the tonnage issue was set aside while Madison’s proposed 
imposts were debated.33
On April 21, the House returned to the issue of tonnage, the first 
point of discussion (in the order of Madison’s resolution) being how much 
American vessels should be charged.   Massachusetts’ Benjamin Goodhue 
(whose state was a major center of the American shipping industry) opened 
the debate by questioning why Congress should impose any tonnage on 
American vessels at all.34  The response provided by Pennsylvania’s 
Thomas Fitzsimons gives us the first mention of lighthouses by the First 
Congress:  Why was tonnage needed?  In order to raise sufficient revenue 
for “lighthouses, and regulation of places that are incident to them.”35
Madison agreed, and chimed in with the suggestion that there were also 
other “establishments incident to commerce” for which “some small 
provision of this kind was necessary”—such as hospitals for disabled 
seamen.36
The above quotes could certainly support a conclusion that Congress 
set out to assert national control over the lighthouses, and then looked to the 
tonnage duty as a means for funding it.  But such a conclusion is called into 
doubt by the underlying motives of the actors, by comments of other 
Congressmen, by the actions of Congress as a deliberative body, and by the 
historical background.  Nationalization of the lighthouse program and 
imposition of federal tonnage duties on both American and foreign shipping 
represents a chicken and egg problem:  did federal tonnage policy require 
32
 X DHOFFC at 12 (Apr. 9, 1789) (Lloyd’s Notes, 9 Apr.) (noting the differing 
interests states had respecting tonnage duties, and threatening vote against Madison’s 
resolution if the tonnage duty were “persisted in”); George C. Rogers, Jr., Evolution of a 
Federalist:  William Loughton Smith of Charleston 173-74 (1962) (discussing how a high 
tonnage rate on foreign vessels would hurt South Carolina).
33
 X DHOFFC at 49 (Tucker, Apr. 11, 1789) (Lloyd’s Notes, 11 Apr.); id. at 111 
(Madison, Apr. 14, 1789) (Congressional Register, 14 Apr.).
34 Id. at 223 (Apr. 21, 1789) (Lloyd’s Notes, 21 Apr.) (Goodhue:  “At a loss for 
tonnage at  all. . . .I wish some gentleman give reason why a duty on American vessels.”).
35 Id. at 223 (Apr. 21, 1789) (Lloyd’s Notes, 21 Apr.).
36 Id. at 254 (Apr. 21, 1789) (Congressional Register, 21 Apr.).  The phrase “incident 
to commerce” appears in only one of the three extant versions of Madison’s speech.  
Lloyd’s Notes reads as follows:  “Several necessary purposes required, conveniently 
provided for by tonnage duty—hospital for mariners.  Some fund raising from ships would 
be natural and convenient for this purpose….”  Id. at 224 (Lloyd’s Notes, 21 Apr.).  In The 
Daily Advertiser, Madison is recorded as having said “there was a number of objects to 
which this duty would be most properly applied, and which rendered this tax proper and 
expedient—such were the support of light-houses, the erecting hospitals for disabled 
seamen and other things of that sort—For these purposes a tax on shipping was the most 
natural and convenient resource.”  Id. at 241 (Daily Advertiser, 22 Apr.).  
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federal responsibility for lighthouses, or did a perceived need for a federal 
lighthouse policy result in an imposition of additional tonnage duties?  The 
weight of the evidence suggests the former is much more likely:  the driving 
force behind Congress’ action was tonnage policy, and not lighthouses.
Both Fitzsimons and Madison shared the intent to impose a 
discriminatory tonnage on foreign vessels in order to protect and encourage 
American ship-building.  Fitzsimons also thought that foreign tonnage was 
an important source of revenue to be exploited.37  Of course, if revenue 
generation from foreign ships were a legislative goal, then the same amount 
of discrimination (in terms of the absolute difference in cents-per-ton) 
would yield greater revenue from foreign shipping if American tonnage 
were set above zero (e.g., zero cents versus twenty cents per ton generates 
more revenue than ten cents versus thirty cents per ton).  But even if 
discrimination were the only purpose in determining where foreign tonnage 
should be set, then either setting domestic tonnage at zero or disclaiming a 
need to provide for lighthouses could have posed problems for achieving a 
meaningful national tonnage policy.  
For one thing, Fitzsimons and Madison must have been able to 
foresee that the lower the American tonnage, the harder it would be to 
subsequently convince opposing Congressmen to set foreign tonnage high 
enough to have an impact on foreign nation’s shipping policies.38  Second, 
setting the domestic tonnage duty at zero and foregoing federal lighthouse 
operation could have threatened the system of a unified policy of 
discriminatory tonnage.
If the national government did not assess any tonnage duties on 
American shipping, that would leave a potential source of revenue open to 
the states.  To the extent some states exploited that source, and others did 
not, it would be impossible to keep the nation’s discriminatory tonnage 
policy uniform.  Of course, as discussed above, the Constitution limited 
37 Id. at 491 (May 6, 1789) (Congressional Register, 6 May).  Madison disclaimed 
wanting a high foreign tonnage in order to generate revenue.  Id. at 497.  Others agreed 
with Fitzsimons.  Id. at 497 (Page). 
38 See id. at 488 (Livermore, arguing that a high foreign tonnage duty was needed in 
order to have something to give up to Britain when she is willing to enter into a treaty); 496 
(Ames, arguing against those who said that foreign duty ought not to exceed more than two 
or three times the duty laid on American shipping:  “I beg to remind gentlemen it never 
was the intention of the House to impose any duty whatever on American shipping, the 6 
cents that were laid was upon a different principle.  This being the case, gentlemen will not 
draw any inference from what was done, to favor what is yet to be done….”); 453 (May 5, 
1789) (Congressional Register, 5 May) (Jackson, saying that a foreign duty of 20 cents 
created sufficient encouragement of American shipping because “the duty on our own 
being only 6 cents”).
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state authority to assess tonnage duties by requiring congressional 
consent.39  However, if the lighthouse system were left in state hands, states 
with ports would have a legitimate ground for seeking such consent—by 
potentially widely differing amounts depending on the number of 
lighthouses and local variations in operating costs, not to mention any 
political desires to adjust the amount of tonnage “required.”  Given the 
necessity of lighthouse operation, it would be difficult indeed for Congress 
not to grant such consent.  Thus, those in favor of a uniform discriminatory 
tonnage policy—such as Madison and Fitzsimons—had a strong motive to 
lay the responsibility for lighthouses on the federal treasury in order to 
justify imposition of domestic tonnage duties, in that way securing complete 
federal control over the domestic-foreign tonnage differential, as well as the 
absolute amount of tonnage assessed to any foreign nation.40
As the rest of the historical evidence bears out, federalization of 
lighthouses was not important as a national public works policy, but as a 
taxation policy.41  Though by its very nature, the subsequent passage of the 
39
 U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
40
 In assessing whether Madison was truly concerned that important national programs 
be federally funded, or whether his reference to “establishments incident to commerce” 
was a way of justifying his tonnage resolution, it is worth pointing out (1) that he never 
attempted to enumerate a complete list of such establishments:  “I think sufficient reason 
given why some duty imposed on these [American] vessels.” (X DHOFFC at 224 (Apr. 21, 
1789) (Lloyd’s Notes, 21 Apr.) (Madison)); and (2) the low domestic tonnage of six cents 
was agreed to without any data regarding the states’ lighthouse expenses and funding, other 
than a comment by Fitzsimons that Pennsylvania laid a duty of 6 to 7 cents which covered 
lighthouse and pilot expenses and added little more.  Id. at 225 (Fitzsimons); see id. at 224 
(Smith, Maryland, saying that the proposed six cents was “so moderate” as to not injure 
merchants, and that tonnage duties in Maryland and other states were far larger). 
   As it turned out, the only “establishment” Madison mentioned other than 
lighthouses—hospitals for disabled seamen—was not legislated for until the Fifth Congress 
(1798), and funding was provided not from tonnage but from deductions from the seamen’s 
salaries.  5th Cong., Sess. II, Ch. 77 (July 16, 1798).  Although a bill providing for a marine 
hospital had first been introduced in August 1789, the matter was continuously tabled over 
the years, despite two separate petitions (in 1791 and 1793) for congressional action.  See I 
House Journal 63, 92, 111, 112, 137, 364, 696; II House Journal 16, 250-51.  
41
 During the tonnage debate, one representative suggested that the purposes that had 
been asserted as requiring a domestic tonnage (lighthouses and hospitals) could be funded 
by impost duties on goods, so that no tonnage on American shipping was necessary.  X 
DHOFFC at 224 (Apr. 21, 1789, Sturges) (Lloyd’s Notes, 21 Apr.) and 241 (The Daily 
Advertiser, 22 Apr.).  Madison and his supporters simply ignored the suggestion.  Whether 
that was a politically or fiscally workable solution was never debated.  But it is easy to see 
that it would not have constituted wise tax policy.  The issue here was not just preserving 
uniform tonnage policy, but “preempting” as many sources of revenue as the federal 
government had, constitutionally, at its disposal.  Cf. Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick, 
The Age of Federalism 118-19 (1993) (noting that Hamilton’s desire to have the federal 
government assume outstanding state debts stemmed in part from a desire “to preempt the 
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Lighthouse Act of 1789 carried with it federalism implications connected 
with the Act’s exercise of federal commerce powers, its genesis in the 
Tonnage Act debate reflects that the real underlying federalism issue 
concerned federal taxation policy.  Congress’ decision to exercise its 
Constitutional grant of exclusive power over tonnage duties ended up 
dictating the division of federal and state responsibility over the major 
structures funded by those duties.
Two questions of federal power—whether Congress should “take up 
[the] business” of lighthouses, and whether Congress could constitutionally 
do so—were briefly mentioned during the Tonnage debate.42  The latter was 
passed over without further discussion (at least for now; it was discussed 
when the Lighthouse Act was debated).  But the first question received 
decidedly more attention.  The key answer to the question was provided by 
South Carolina’s Thomas Tucker:  “If we neglect this measure at present [I] 
don’t know how the lighthouses are to be supported . . . .”43  Tucker did not 
elaborate on the nature of his concern, but he had to be referring to the 
states’ inability to charge tonnage without Congressional consent.  The only 
other possible meanings for his words can be ruled out as implausible or 
without factual foundation.
Why would support of the nations’ lighthouses be threatened if 
Congress did not address the tonnage issue right away?  There are really 
only two possibilities other than the Constitution’s tonnage clause:  (1) That 
the Constitution clearly mandated that the federal government operate the 
best sources of revenue for the United States Treasury”).  Charging even a relatively small 
amount of domestic tonnage presented states’ citizens with a tax burden that would help 
minimize a state’s political will (and ability) to seek consent for additional tonnage 
assessments for its own purposes. 
42
 Although Massachusetts’ George Partridge agreed that pilots and lighthouses would 
constitute expenses legitimately covered by tonnage (and, according to Partridge, the only 
legitimate ones at that), he found Fitzsimons’ attempt to secure tonnage for those expenses 
to be premature because “We don’t know that such expense will arise.  It is proposed by 
some gentlemen to take up this business.  Whether or no is uncertain.”  X DHOFFC at 224-
25 (Apr. 21, 1789) (Lloyd’s Notes, 21 Apr.).  Partridge suggested waiting for a bill to 
brought in for the purpose of paying pilots and supporting lighthouses:  “If that found 
expense to United States, then time enough to charge the ships of United States with this 
expense.”  Id. at 224.
    Later in the debate, Virginia’s Theodorick Bland questioned whether the federal 
government had the power to run the lighthouses, suggesting that if the Constitution “had 
in view institution of lighthouses and other things, [it] might have given [Congress] this 
power by introducing a few words.”  Id. at 395 (May 4, 1789) (Lloyd’s Notes, 4 May).
43 Id. at 225 (Apr. 21, 1789) (Lloyd’s Notes, 21 Apr.)(“If we neglect this measure at 
present don’t know how the lighthouses are to be supported….I think a light duty is 
necessary and appears if take up tonnage at all then [this is] proper time to fix what it 
should be.”).
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lighthouses, and states lacked all authority to do so themselves; or (2) That 
the states were, in fact, failing to keep up their lighthouses and federal 
intervention was needed to keep the lighthouses running.  As for the first 
possibility, it would have been remarkable for the anti-federalist leaning 
Tucker to have taken such a position (indeed, he made the complete 
opposite argument months later during the Lighthouse Act debate).  As for 
the second possibility, there is no historical evidence of major systemic 
failures in lighthouse operation throughout the states, let alone any evidence 
of Congressional perception of such failures.44  In fact, Tucker subsequently 
proposed a scheme that would have left states in control of lighthouse 
operation, supported by a part of the federal tonnage money (6 cents per 
ton) and whatever additional amounts an individual state needed to assess in 
order to maintain its lights.  And though Tucker’s proposal was rejected, the 
lighthouse bill that was passed implicitly allowed for the possibility of 
continued state lighthouse operation.45
On the other hand, when Tucker questioned how lighthouses would 
be supported if Congress did not assess a tonnage duty to do so, one thing 
was certainly true:  Under the Constitution, the states had no authority to 
collect tonnage duties unless they had been given congressional consent to 
do so.  And as no state had requested such consent, Tucker’s point was that 
unless Congress acted to fill the revenue gap, the states would be left 
without the main source of funding they relied upon to keep the lighthouses 
burning.46
44
 As discussed above, states at the time were not only operating current lighthouses 
but were engaging in building projects for new ones.  See supra, ___.  Though shipwrights 
and mercantile interests petitioned the First Congress throughout the first few months of its 
first session, Congress did not receive any petitions decrying a poor state of lighthouse 
management or expressing an urgent need that the federal government take over lighthouse 
operation.
45 See, infra, at ____. 
46 See also X DHOFFC at 224 (Apr. 21, 1789) (Lloyd’s Notes, 21 Apr.) (William 
Smith, saying that states repealed tonnage laws because “[i]t was supposed necessary.”).  
Of course, one answer to that predicament would have been for Congress to give consent to 
the states to charge a tonnage duty.  Although Tucker eventually pushed for that very 
solution during debate on the Lighthouse Act, he did not raise that possibility during the 
tonnage debate.  One wonders whether he did not mind his colleagues’ linking of 
lighthouse operation with domestic tonnage because he wanted to make sure that 
Massachusetts did not succeed in its attempt to leave domestic ships free of all tonnage.  
Apparently, once he partially lost the debate on the discriminatory foreign tonnage, he 
sought to limit the amount of federal monies used to support lighthouses, with a 
corresponding grant of power to each state to assess additional duties as needed.  See, infra, 
at ___.  
   In any event, as the above discussion shows, providing universal consent to states for 
lighthouse operation would not have been a popular solution in Congress (and, in fact, it 
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Either Congress needed to validate state tonnage collection by 
consenting to it, or it needed to fund lighthouses itself.  The debate on the 
Tonnage Act left no doubt as to which policy Congress would follow.  
Consent was not palatable.  The Constitution empowered Congress to 
institute a uniform federal tonnage policy, and uniformity was a desired end 
in the first months of the First Congress.  Achievement of that end was best 
served by federal control of lighthouses.    
It would be inappropriate to conclude that because of the linkage 
between tonnage policy and lighthouses Congressmen simply ignored the 
question whether Congress in fact had the power under the Constitution to 
operate lighthouses.  The issue did end up getting debated when the 
Lighthouse Act was considered.  But still, what are we to make of the fact 
that the question was ignored during the Tonnage debate, even while 
lighthouse support was being used as a reason for assessing tonnage 
duties?47
On the one hand, discussion of constitutionality may have been 
considered premature.  To the extent that the Tonnage Act simply 
established the fees that ships could be charged for lighthouse management, 
such legislation would seem to come squarely—and uncontroversially—
within the Commerce Clause’s power to regulate commerce.48
On the other hand, members of the House no doubt understood that 
including lighthouse fees in the Tonnage Act went hand-in-hand with 
additional federal activity, such as, at the very least, paying for state 
lighthouse expenses out of the federal treasury.49  Why, then, was the House 
was rejected by Congress when Tucker moved for it months later).
47
 The six cents domestic tonnage was agreed to by the House of Representatives on 
April 21.  X DHOFFC at 242.  On May 29, the House passed the entire tonnage bill and 
sent it to the Senate.  VI DHOFFC 1950.  Only days later, on June 2, did it form a 
committee to bring in a bill for regulating lighthouses.  V DHOFFC 1246.  The Tonnage 
Act was passed by both houses on July 9, and signed into law by the President on July 20.  
VI DHOFFC 1951.  The Lighthouse Act was first debated on July 16, and was signed into 
law on August 7.  V DHOFFC 1247-48.  Despite one congressman having explicitly raised 
the issue of constitutionality during the tonnage debate (see, supra, note ___), the Tonnage 
Act was passed without debate on the matter.
48 See, supra, note ___, discussing the relationship between tonnage duties and the 
regulation of commerce.  This relationship was understood, and lobbied for, by those 
outside of Congress.  On May 25, 1789, Congress received a petition from the Shipwrights 
of Philadelphia, seeking certain regulations that would benefit American shipping.  Second 
on the shipwrights’ list was a proposal “to encourage the Increase of American Shipping” 
by laying no tonnage duty on American ships “except for the support of Bays [Buoys] & 
Lighthouses.”  VIII DHOFFC 348, 349.  
49 See X DHOFFC at 224-25 (Apr. 21) (Lloyd’s Notes, 21 Apr.) (comments of 
Partridge:  If supporting lighthouses and paying pilots are “found expense to the United 
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so willing to include what was essentially “light money” in the Tonnage Act 
before a lighthouse bill was even drawn up and debated?  Was it so clear 
that a lighthouse bill would be constitutional?  To attempt an answer to that 
question, we must first examine the legislative history of the Lighthouse 
Act.
2. Debate and Passage of the Lighthouse Act: Commerce Clause 
Interpretive Precedent is Established  
The Tonnage Act meant that the United States treasury would 
possess money collected for the support of lighthouses.  But important 
questions remained:  How would that money be distributed?  Who would be 
in charge of spending it?  Who would operate the lighthouses?  Would the 
federal government be involved in constructing new lighthouses?  Congress 
explored a variety of solutions to these questions, but every draft bill shared 
two things in common:  state choice and federal control.  Both elements set
the stage for the constitutional debate that followed.    
State choice
From the very first draft, the operating principle was that the federal 
government would not fund or operate a state’s lighthouse unless the state 
wanted it to.50  For example, the first draft provided that upon a state’s 
“application” to the Secretary of the Treasury, the federal government 
would provide the state’s lighthouse(s) with an “overseer,” with necessary 
materials for keeping the lights, and would reimburse the expense of 
supporting the lights.51  Thus—no state application, no federal funds.
In the version of the law that was enacted, the element of consent 
was delayed, but present nonetheless:  in the first instance, the federal 
government would, without the need for a specific state request, pay for the 
“support, maintenance, and repairs” of all lighthouses; however, such 
payments would stop after a year unless the state in question had in the 
States, then time enough to charge the ships of United States with this expense;” and “It is 
proposed by some gentlemen to take up this business.  Whether or no is uncertain.”).
50
 V DHOFFC 1248 (Lighthouses Bill {HR-12}, July 1, 1789); 1249 (same, July 20, 
1789); 1252 (same, July 24, 1789).  The only “exception” was a provision for federal 
construction of a new lighthouse at Cape Henry, which Virginia had apparently requested.  
See Hamilton to Commissioners of Cape Fear, June 11, 1791, reprinted in VII Syrett at 
464.  But even there, the Act provided that the new lighthouse would only be erected when 
the selected land was ceded by Virginia.  Thus, Virginia had the ultimate say in the matter.
51
 V DHOFFC 1248 (section 1 of the bill).  Additionally, if the state ceded the 
lighthouse and land to the United States, the federal government would keep the light “in 
good repair at the expense of the United States.”
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meantime ceded jurisdiction and title over the lighthouse lands.52  As 
cession of lighthouses was not mandated, states could effectively opt out of 
the federal lighthouse program by choosing not to cede their lands.53
Is the requirement of state consent constitutionally relevant?  
Though one can certainly glean the political and practical necessities of not 
imposing a federal program on unwilling states, there is nothing to indicate 
that Congress believed that state consent was a constitutional prerequisite to 
federal funding of lighthouses, or even federal lighthouse operation by 
“overseers.”  But lighthouses exist in physical space, and the physical space 
of existing lighthouses was located within State boundaries.  If the federal 
government wanted full control over any lighthouse lands—not just title, 
but exclusive federal jurisdiction as well—then state consent would indeed 
be required, by the Constitution’s “Enclave Clause.”54
There is another reason, though, that the draft bills’ provision for 
state consent is constitutionally relevant—and in a manner that bears 
directly on our analysis of the Lighthouse Act as an early construction of 
the Commerce Clause.  If states had the power to opt out of federal support 
of their lighthouses, then they were not constitutionally precluded from the 
field of lighthouse operation.  In short, all of Congress’ draft lighthouse 
bills reflect an understanding that if the federal government did not act, the 
states still (theoretically) could.55
52
 Lighthouse Act, § 1.
53
 However, the phrasing of the law leaves one with the impression of federal coercion 
(effectively, “do this if you want federal funds”) rather than state choice.  In the context of 
the Tonnage Act, which secured for the federal treasury the duties customarily used to fund 
lighthouse operation, the proviso was indeed coercive.  That was not lost on
Massachusetts’ lieutenant-governor, Samuel Adams.  See, infra, ____.
54
 Article I’s “Enclave Clause” provides that Congress shall exercise “exclusive 
legislation . . . over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the State in 
which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other 
needful buildings.”  U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.   From an early date, the power of 
“legislation” was equated with “jurisdiction.”  See, e.g., United States v. Bevans, 17 U.S. 
337, 388 (1818)  (“the power of exclusive legislation (which is jurisdiction) is united with 
cession of territory”).  
   Thus, in the final version of the Lighthouse Act, the proviso for state consent was not 
a political act of federal restraint, but an act of constitutional necessity.  
55 See Alexander Hamilton, Draft Opinion on the National Bank, reprinted in VIII 
Syrett at 104 (referring to Lighthouse Act as an analogous exercise of federal authority 
supporting broad interpretation of “necessary” powers, and stating that it could not be 
“affirmed” that it “was absolutely necessary that provision should be made for this object 
[i.e. lighthouses] by the National Government or that the interests of Trade would have 
essentially suffered if it had been left upon its former footing or that the power of 
regulating trade would be nugatory . . . .”).   
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Federal Control
Every draft of the lighthouse bill provided not just for use of federal 
monies in the support of lighthouses, but for federal control over how that 
support would be carried out.56  Tucker and fellow South Carolinian 
William Loughton Smith tried to change that, but failed.57  As debate on the 
lighthouse bill opened, Tucker moved to strike out the whole bill (except 
the enacting clause) and substitute it with a bill that kept lighthouses under 
state control.  Under Tucker’s plan, basic funding would come from the 
federal government (through an appropriation of a proportion of tonnage 
duties, not to exceed six cents per ton) but if those monies were not 
sufficient states would be empowered to lay additional tonnage duties in 
harbors with lighthouses.58
 In Tucker’s motion, we see the inextricable link between the 
Tonnage Act and operation of the nation’s lighthouses.  Tucker could 
perhaps have simply suggested keeping the states in charge of both 
lighthouse operation and funding, but (and remember his comments to this 
effect during the Tonnage Act debate) complete state funding would not 
work because the federal government was collecting tonnage duties.  Thus, 
Tucker’s motion provided for state operation using federal appropriations 
(the six cents “assigned” to lighthouses during the Tonnage Act debate).  It 
is a solution that carried with it problems for both the federal government 
56
 At first glance, the Act appears to provide merely for federal reimbursement of state 
expenditures.  However, federal control is implied by section 3, which requires the 
Secretary of the Treasury, with Presidential approval, to contract for lighthouse rebuilding 
and maintenance, furnishing of supplies, and the hiring of persons appointed by the 
President to superintend and care for the lighthouses.  
57
 Tucker and Smith were political rivals whose leanings were towards opposite ends 
of the anti-federalist (Tucker) and federalist (Smith) spectrum.  But they both shared their 
state’s concern about protecting South Carolina’s trade with Great Britain from harmful 
actions by the federal government, and they joined together both in the Tonnage Act debate 
and in debate on the Lighthouse Act.  George C. Rogers, Jr., Evolution of a Federalist:  
William Loughton Smith of Charleston (1758-1812) 168, 171, 173-77, 180 (1962).  
58
 Tucker’s motion was paraphrased in the Daily Advertiser as follows:
The principle of this was to place the establishment both of light 
house and pilots in the hands and under the controul of the state 
government, the former to be supported by the appropriation of a 
certain proportion of the duty on tonnage of vessels, not exceeding 
six cents per ton—and in case that were insufficient, that each state 
should have power to lay an additional tonnage duty on all vessels 
entering the ports where such houses were erected, and that pilots 
should be under the direction of the states.
XI DHOFFC 1130 (July 16, 1789) (Daily Adv., 17 July).  As mentioned below, the 
Lighthouse Act left regulation of pilots—at least for the moment—in State control.  See,
infra, at ___.
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(which would lose control over how its money was spent) and the states 
(whose lighthouses might require additional funding).  
Enabling states to assess additional tonnage duties would solve the 
second problem, but in pushing for that solution Tucker was fighting an 
uphill battle on a hill that was built when the Maryland delegates lost their 
tonnage motion two years earlier at the Constitutional Convention.  With 
the Constitution prohibiting states from assessing tonnage duties without 
federal consent, Tucker had no leverage in the lighthouse debate.  
  Basically, state control over tonnage duties was not going to 
happen.  And once the Tonnage Act asserted federal control over tonnage 
duties, then federal funding of lighthouses was, as a practical matter, a 
required policy—or rather, the offer of federal funding was required.  
Forcing states to operate lighthouses at the same time the federal 
government was capturing all tonnage duties would have been unfair.   And 
it is certainly understandable that Congress would want to place lighthouses 
under their control if they were going to be footing the bill.
The question, of course, is what does the Constitution have to say 
about all of this?  Tucker’s motion led to a debate in the House that touched 
on that very topic.
The Commerce Clause Debate
Unfortunately, only a portion of the debate sparked by Tucker’s 
motion has been preserved.  After reporting on opposing arguments made 
by Pennsylvania’s Fitzsimons (who had been a member of the committee 
that drafted the initial lighthouse bill, and represented a state whose 
merchants strongly supported the legislation) and Tucker and Smith, the 
Daily Advertiser leaves us with the unhelpful summary “[o]ther arguments 
were used on both sides.”  
Such as it is, we know at least this from the reported debate:  
Echoing Madison’s comment during the tonnage debate about powers 
“incidental” to the Commerce Clause, Fitzsimons stated that the 
Constitution conferred every power “incidental and necessary to it,” and
that “regulations respecting light houses . . . were a part of the commercial 
system and had been given up by the states.”  In response, Tucker and 
Smith contended that the lighthouse bill “was an infringement on the rights 
of the states; that these establishments were not necessarily incidental to the 
power of commerce.”59
59
 XI DHOFFC 1130 (July 16, 1789) (Daily Adv., 17 July).  Fitzsimons was actually 
arguing that Tucker’s proposed bill was unconstitutional, not that the committee’s bill was 
constitutional.  However, Fitzsimons’ commerce clause argument implicitly provides an 
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And so, we know that the Commerce Clause was cited to justify the 
Lighthouse Act, and we know that some Congressmen believed that control 
over the nation’s lighthouses was outside the scope of that enumerated 
power.  Whether or not other powers were cited, but not recorded for 
posterity, we cannot say with certainty.  But those looking back during the 
First Federal Congress cited only the Commerce Clause as the source of 
authority for the Act, and President Jefferson later remembered that 
opposition to the Act focused on the proper scope of the Commerce 
Clause.60  To use David Currie’s phrasing of the Commerce Clause issue, 
the potential problem with the Lighthouse Act is this:  “the construction and 
operation of [lighthouses] is not itself regulation of commerce, and not 
obviously necessary or proper for its regulation, which is what the 
Constitution seems literally to require.”61
Whether “regulation” of commerce broadly included enactment of 
measures to facilitate commerce would remain a point of contention for 
answer to the latter question.  As David Currie has pointed out, Fitzsimons’ words—as 
reported by the Daily Advertiser—can be read as suggesting not just that federal action was 
lawful, but that “the subject could not be left to the states.”  David P. Currie, The 
Constitution In Congress 70 n.117 (1997).  However, such an argument would be 
inconsistent with the bill reported by Fitzsimons’ committee (as well as all subsequent 
versions of the bill), because, as discussed above, the bill left it in states’ hands to choose 
whether or not they wanted federal operation of their lighthouses.  Assuming the 
paraphrasing we have is accurate, the phrase “had been given up by the states” is probably 
best interpreted as a broadly phrased statement of the legitimacy of federal power.  
Notably, in his attempt to “shoot down” Tucker’s proposal to leave things under state 
control, Fitzsimons also broadly argued that Tucker’s amendment was unconstitutional 
because states could not lay imposts, though, as Tucker and Smith rightly pointed out, 
“[n]othing was clearer…than that each state had a power of laying an impost with the 
consent of Congress; and if Congress by this law expressed their consent, the 
supplementary duty proposed by the amendment was perfectly constitutional.”  XI 
DHOFFC 1130 (July 16, 1789) (Daily Adv., 17 July).  
60
 A year and a half later, participants in the National Bank debate, citing the precedent 
of the Lighthouse Act to establish the Bank’s constitutionality, similarly grounded federal 
lighthouse authority in the commerce clause.  See XIV DHOFFC 388 (Ames, Feb. 3, 
1791); Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act to Establish a Bank, VIII Syrett 97, 104 
(“This doubtless must be referred to the power of regulating trade, and is fairly relative to 
it.”).  
    Years later, when Jefferson questioned how the Commerce Clause could empower 
Congress to build piers, if it did not also permit the (indistinguishable) power to build 
factories, he recollected that opposition to the Lighthouse Act was made “on this very 
ground.”  David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress:  Jefferson and the West, 1801-
1809, 39 Wm. and Mary L. Rev. 1441, 1500 n.314 (May 1998) (quoting Letter from 
Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin (Oct. 13, 1802)).    
    For a general discussion of possible Constitutional arguments that could have 
supported the Lighthouse Act, see Currie, supra note 8, at 69-70. 
61
  Currie, supra note 8, at 70.
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decades afterwards.62  And it is unclear how secure the members of the First 
Federal Congress in August 1789 would have been in explicitly adopting 
such a broad definition of “regulation.”  Widely accepted was the general 
precept that a central aim of the federal government should be to aid 
commerce by regulation (such as enactment of the Tonnage Act and 
establishment of nationally uniform impost duties).  Far murkier is the 
degree to which members of the First Congress would have agreed that the 
phrase “to regulate commerce” itself meant to take any measure that would 
protect, facilitate or encourage commerce—or even the narrower concept of 
creating or operating any facility that would affect commerce.63  Even 
Hamilton, in his December 1791 Report on the Subject of Manufactures, 
had to admit to a lack of consensus regarding the constitutionality of federal 
involvement in road and canal building projects that would facilitate the 
transportation of commodities.64
62 Compare 30 Annals of Cong. 889-90 (1817)(Sheffey:  the words “to regulate” 
commerce conferred the power “to afford it all reasonable facilities”) with id. at 897-98 
(Barbour:  “To regulate, was to prescribe, to direct; the power, therefore, ‘to regulate 
commerce amongst the several States,” meant the right to prescribe the manner, terms, and 
conditions, on which that commerce should be carried on.”).  See, infra, ___.
63
  During the Confederation period, the regulation of commerce and the protection, or 
encouragement, of trade were virtually interchangeable concepts—but as ends or goals.   
The means by which one fostered trade was through regulations.  See, e.g., 26 Journals of 
the Continental Congress 321-22 (Apr. 30, 1784).  As Madison put it, in his 1828 letter 
opining on the Constitutionality of a tariff imposed for the encouragement of manufactures, 
“the power to regulate trade with foreign nations . . . embraces the object of encouraging by 
duties, restrictions, and prohibitions, the manufactures and products of the country.”  4 
Elliot’s Debates 600, 601.  See supra note ___. 
     During the debate on the National Bank, Hamilton expanded the means to the end, 
suggesting that “an establishment which furnishes facilities to circulation and a convenient 
medium of exchange & alienation, is to be regarded as a regulation of trade.”  VIII Syrett 
127.  On the other hand, both Randolph and Jefferson defined the power to regulate 
commerce in terms limited to enactment of rules and prescriptions (id. at 115 n.24 and 126) 
and Madison’s suggested list of enumerated powers that could (but did not) permit creation 
of the Bank did not even include the Commerce Clause.  2 Annals 1946 (Feb. 2, 1791).  As 
supporters of the National Bank cited a number of enumerated powers justifying the 
legislation, passage of the Act cannot be considered a definitive vote on the scope of the 
Commerce Clause.  Much less significant proposals intended to encourage or assist 
commerce were rejected by the First Congress, but as objections included both policy and 
constitutional grounds, the debates similarly do not permit a conclusion one way or the 
other as to whether constitutional concerns held sway.  See Currie at 71-73 (discussing 
proposal that Congress underwrite a private voyage to Baffin’s Bay to enhance 
understanding of the magnetic pole, and a proposed loan to rescue a glass factory from 
financial difficulties).     
64
  Improvement of inland navigation, said Hamilton, was an object “worthy of the 
cares of the local administrations; and it were to be wished, that there was no doubt of the 
power of the national Government to lend its direct aid, on a comprehensive plan.”  X 
Syrett 230, 310.  Granted, Hamilton was discussing the encouragement of manufactures, 
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Perhaps most telling of all is Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion 
decades later in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824), after thirty years of 
unquestioned federal lighthouse power.  This is how Marshall rejected 
Ogden’s suggestion that certain powers left to the states demonstrated 
concurrent state and federal power over regulating commerce: 
A State, it is said, or even a private citizen, 
may construct light houses.  But gentlemen 
must be aware, that if this proves a power in a 
State to regulate commerce, it proves that the 
same power is in the citizen.  States, or 
individuals who own lands, may, if not 
forbidden by law, erect on those lands what 
buildings they please; but this power is 
entirely distinct from that of regulating 
commerce, and may, we presume, be 
restrained, if exercised so as to produce a 
public mischief.65
Thus we see that even in the most significant statement of federal 
Commerce Clause power to date, the building of an internal improvement 
project is characterized as something other than commercial “regulation.”66
That the issue had not been conclusively understood differently back in 
and not commerce—the two cannot be conflated—but if Congress were of the view that 
roads and canals were permissible under the Commerce Clause, that would have been 
sufficient to serve Hamilton’s purposes. 
In a subsequent House debate during the Second Congress spurred by a Senate bill 
that proposed paying a “bounty” to the desperate owners of boats employed in cod 
fisheries, the narrow view of the Commerce Clause can be heard in the remarks of 
representatives Page and Giles.  3 Annals of Cong. 393-94 (1792) (encouragement to 
commerce might redound to honor of Congress, but the “wise framers” saw that if 
Congress had power to exert a “royal munificence” for that purpose it might reward the 
ingenuity of one state’s citizens over another); id. at 398 (right to regulate commerce may 
give rise to indirect “bounty” resulting from the right to make commercial regulations, but 
that is they only type of bounty that can be given).  Though there certainly were other 
thorny issues relating to the proposed bounty, one wonders how much briefer the debate 
would have been had there been a widespread understanding that the power to regulate 
commerce broadly included the power to facilitate commerce.  Indeed, perhaps many 
words could have been spared over a decades worth of “general welfare” debates if it were 
understood that the Commerce Clause enabled Congress to simply spend money to 
facilitate commerce.
65 Id. at 208-09.  Consistent with the above, Marshall narrowly defined the power to 
regulate as the power “to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed.”  
66
 Marshall’s language was not lost on opponents of federally-sponsored internal 
improvements.  See, infra, ___.  
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1789, one need only look at today’s originalist scholarship.  As well-
established as the application has become these 200-plus years later, the 
idea that the Commerce Clause empowers the federal government to 
facilitate commerce through internal improvement projects is one that 
modern-day originalists either still ignore or struggle mightily with.67
So why the apparent lack of concern by a majority of the First 
Federal Congress (including, presumably, James Madison) over the 
Lighthouse Act’s potential stretching of the Commerce Clause?  For one 
thing, the Act’s passage should not obscure the fact that Congress was still 
treading gingerly in this area.  Initial drafts of the bill were limited to 
operation of lighthouses, beacons, and buoys, with “piers” being added only 
after a group of Philadelphia merchants lobbied for their inclusion—based 
on the fact that the Philadelphia port wardens had commenced construction 
of piers that would be left without funding by virtue of the Tonnage Act.68
No mention at all was made of river clean-up or harbor improvement, items 
that seem indistinguishable from lighthouses in rendering navigation “easy 
and safe.”  A separate bill proposing a hospital for seamen—which Madison 
had similarly referred to as an “incident” of commerce—was tabled.69  And 
the regulation of pilots—if anything, a much clearer example of true 
commercial “regulation,” and no less an example of legislation that would 
be geared to making navigation “easy and safe”—was left under state 
control “until further legislative provision shall be made by Congress;” and 
no such further provision was made.70  So, as boldly as Congress was 
67 See Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 101, 139-46 (Winter 2001) (starting with proposition that “The power to regulate is, 
in essence, the power to say, ‘if you want to do something, here is how you must do it,’” 
and exploring whether such a power could also include the power to prohibit certain types 
of commerce); Grant S. Nelson and Robert J. Pushaw, Rethinking the Commerce Clause:  
Apply First Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations but Preserve State 
Control over Social Issues, 85 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 39-42 (Oct. 1999) (conceding that whether 
the Framers and Ratifiers’ intent included the power to create internal improvements is 
“debatable,” but satisfying themselves that the original conception of commerce “possibly 
encompassed internal improvements”).
68
 Philadelphia Merchants to the Pennsylvania Delegation, dated July 16, 1789 (on file 
at the Federal First Congress Project, Wash., D.C.).  An early example of successful 
lobbying, the Lighthouse Act incorporates a fair amount of language from a proposed bill 
that the merchants sent with their letter.  V DHOFFC 1248-54.
69
  1 House Journal 112 (Sept. 16, 1789).  See, supra, note ___. 
70
 Lighthouse Act, § 4.  Not only did later Congresses fail to act on proposals to 
regulate pilots both locally and nationally, they tabled proposals seeking a nationwide 
system of harbor regulation.  See I House Journal 92, 112, 137, 451, 456, 489, 615; II 
House Journal 29.  However, pilots were as important as lighthouses in assuring safe 
passage into harbors.  See Petition of the Boston Marine Society, Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts, to the honorable Senate and the honorable House of Representatives of said 
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moving, the Lighthouse Act was still a somewhat limited move in asserting 
control over “incidents” of commerce (to use Madison’s word), or in 
funding projects to make navigation “easy and safe” (to use the words of the 
Act).
Limited or not, though, Congress’ first statute construing the 
Commerce Clause nonetheless represented an interpretation of the clause 
that was potentially broad in application (though there is no evidence that 
any such future applications were discussed).  In determining why Congress 
was not dissuaded by Tucker and Smith’s contention that lighthouses “were 
not necessarily incidental to the power of commerce,” one cannot overlook 
the power of a Congressional sense of fairness.  The fact that Congress was 
denying the States the right to collect money specifically appropriated for 
lighthouses was not lost on participants and observers of the day.  Even 
Tucker’s motion called for federal funding of lighthouses.  And even anti-
federalist Sam Adams, venting his opposition to the Act in correspondence 
to Elbridge Gerry, observed that if “Congress by Virtue of the Power vested 
in them have taken from the State for the general Use the necessary Means 
of supporting such Buildings, it appears reasonable and just that the United 
States should maintain them . . . .”71  Indeed, in lobbying Congress to add 
funding of piers to the Lighthouse bill, the Pennsylvania merchants 
explicitly stated that the amendment was appropriate because Congress 
would be keeping the tonnage duties previously anticipated to be collected 
by the state.72
National tax policy and fairness—these were the forces that led to 
such an early expansion of Commerce Clause power.  But without a firm 
common understanding that the Commerce Clause did indeed empower the 
Commonwealth in General Court assembled at Boston, February 1783 (on file at the 
Massachusetts Archives, in the bill jacket for Ch. 19--1783).    
71
 Samuel Adams to Elbridge Gerry, Aug. 22, 1789.  In this letter, Adams was only 
willing to concede the appropriateness of federal funding, stating “but I think that it follows 
not from hence, that Congress have a Right to exercise any Authority over those Buildings 
even to make Appointments of Officers for the immediate Care of them, or furnishing them 
with necessary Supplies . . . .”  However, the motivating factor of Adams’ correspondence 
was an attempt to protect a friend whom he feared would lose his job to a political 
appointee once the federal government took over.  Samuel Adams to Elbridge Gerry, Aug. 
20, 1789.  In his last letter on the topic, Adams conceded the appropriateness of federal 
control once a state had ceded its lighthouse to the federal government, but argued that the 
federal government should refrain from exercising that authority.  Adams to Gerry, Sept. 
1789 (undated).
72
 Philadelphia Merchants to the Pennsylvania Delegation, dated July 16, 1789.  The 
letter enclosed an estimate of the annual expense of maintaining their port’s lighthouse (“& 
other Accommodations for the Ease & Safety of our Navigation”), which the merchants 
said Congress should provide for “upon the same principles.”  Id.
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federal government to broadly engage in internal improvement projects, 
would the interpretation unleashed so quickly by the Lighthouse Act take 
hold? 
3. The Federal Lighthouse System: Creation of Historical Commerce 
Clause Precedent
To an anti-federalist, what I have described as the “fairness” of the 
Lighthouse Act was something else entirely.  To the ever wary Samuel 
Adams, the choice presented to states by the Lighthouse Act was not a real 
choice at all—states were being forced to consent to federal control.  Adams 
suggested to Elbridge Gerry that Congress would face the same fate as the 
British government if, by governing “too much,” it so insisted on 
unnecessarily forcing states to give the federal government exclusive 
jurisdiction over their lighthouses.  What particularly rankled Adams was 
the combined effect of the Tonnage and Lighthouse Acts:  “The Means of 
supporting these Buildings in this State are taken from its Legislature---It is 
presumed not to be intended that this Legislature shall be told at the End of 
the Year, you must cede your Lighthouse to Congress & the Territory on 
which it stands together with the exclusive Power of Legislation, or it shall 
be of no Use to your state.”73
Whether others did not consider Congress’ behavior as unseemly, or 
whether practical realities won the day, state legislatures fell into line with 
federal policy and gave up their lighthouses fairly promptly, and without 
much sign of controversy.74  The only significant holdout was, perhaps not 
surprisingly, Rhode Island, which did not cede its lighthouse until 1793—
three years after it had finally ratified the Constitution in May 1790.  
However, the state was never cut off from federal lighthouse monies 
because Congress passed a series of one-year extensions of its cession 
deadline.75  Thus, even where push could potentially have come to shove, 
the federal government kept the carrot of federal monies dangling a bit 
longer and employed gentle behind the scenes lobbying rather than holding 
firm to established deadlines.76
73
  Samuel Adams to Elbridge Gerry, Sept. 1789 (undated), on file with the First 
Federal Congress Project.
74 See Pennsylvania (Ch. LLII, Sept. 28, 1789); Virginia, (Ch. V, Nov. 13, 1789); 
South Carolina (Jan. 20, 1790); New York (Ch. 3, Feb. 3, 1790); Connecticut (May 2, 
1790); Massachusetts (June 10, 1790); North Carolina (Ch. II, Nov. 1790); New Hampshire 
(Ch. 71, Feb. 14, 1791). 
75
 R.I. (May 1793).  See 1st Cong., sess. II, ch. 32 (July 22, 1790); 1st Cong., sess. III, 
ch. 24 (Mar. 3, 1791); 2nd Cong., sess. I, ch. 17 (Apr. 12, 1792).  
76
 Evidence suggests, not surprisingly, that the availability of federal monies was the 
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The positive collective state response to the Lighthouse Act is 
reflective of contentment with the Act’s broader implications:  there was to 
be a national lighthouse system, organized and controlled by the federal 
government, with decisions on placement of new lighthouses made by 
federal officials.  What makes that apparent contentment particularly 
interesting is that the Lighthouse Act itself did not provide the executive 
branch with any general powers to construct lighthouses; nor did it assert 
that Congress would exercise such general powers in the future.  Other than 
a specific provision for creation of one lighthouse in Chesapeake Bay, the 
only ongoing duties went no further than maintenance and repair.77
Nonetheless, the ink had barely dried on the Lighthouse Act before a 
merchant in Massachusetts wrote to George Washington asking the 
government to construct a lighthouse on the island of Seguin.78
In short, the import of the Act was obvious—if the federal 
government could (and would) build one lighthouse, it would build others.79
Within 15 years, the lighthouses’ place in the federal sphere of activity was 
motivating factor for the states’ unanimous decisions to cede their lighthouses to the 
federal government.  See XXV State Records of North Carolina (Walter Clark ed.) (1906) 
(Ch. 11 of the laws of 1790) (lighthouse cession specifically including a “whereas” clause 
referring to the fact that “the funds heretofore appropriated by this state [for lighthouses] 
are now vested in [Congress]….”); Notation on bill jacket for Massachusetts Lighthouse 
Bill, and House Journal entry for June 8, 1790 (p.71), both on file at the Massachusetts 
State Archives (ordering Commissary General to lay before the House an account of the 
annual lighthouse expenses, before vote on bill to cede lighthouses).
77
 Lighthouse Act, § 3.  A draft version of the lighthouse bill would have imbued the 
Secretary of the Treasury with the duty to provide by contracts, subject to Presidential 
approval, for the “building or rebuilding” of lighthouses.  However, the general power to 
build was deleted, likely out of separation of powers concerns.  V DHOFFC 1253.  
78
 Samuel Goodwin to George Washington, Nov. 25, 1789, reprinted in 4 Papers of 
George Washington, Presidential Series at 323 (information about Goodwin appears at 
p.302).
79
 In June 1790, Joseph Whipple was appointed Superintendent of “the Light House at 
the Mouth of Piscatqua River in your State as also of any others that may be erected in your 
State.”  Hamilton to Whipple, June 1, 1790, reprinted in VI Syrett at 452.  See also, e.g., 
Newton to Hamilton, June 27, 1790, reprinted in VI Syrett at 474 (proposing lighthouse at 
Old Point Comfort); George Heriot to Daniel Huger (with notations to send to Hamilton), 
dated July 31, 1790 (NARA, RG 26, 17G, Box 1) (expressing that commissioners of port at 
Georgetown, S.C., were sorry to learn that the law did not empower the Secretary of the 
Treasury to build  beacons, as well as repair them; they will depend on representatives to 
bring the matter before Congress); Sam Mitchell to Hamilton, Dec. 3, 1792, XIII Syrett at 
280 (expressing regret that no present new lighthouse is proposed, but stating that perhaps 
“this part of our Coast may be considered and benefited in its Turn”); Hamilton to 
Commissioners of Cape Fear, June 11, 1791, reprinted in VIII Syrett at 464 (stating that 
Lighthouse Act did not extend further than repair and maintenance, but suggesting that 
application to Congress for completion of their lighthouse at Cape Fear probably would 
have met with success). 
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solidified to the point that a House Committee could report that “The liberal 
spirit with which these works have been carried on, is very honorable to the 
national character.”80 Years later, Joseph Story suggested that we “ask 
ourselves how it would be possible, without an efficient national 
government, to provide adequately for the erection and support of 
lighthouses, monuments, buoys, and other guards against shipwreck.”81
Considerations of spirit and necessity aside (accurate or not), federal 
lighthouse construction and operation became ensconced as a legitimate 
constitutional exercise of Commerce Clause authority.  While other forms 
of internal improvements faced persistent challenges, lighthouses remained 
securely within the federal domain.82  Their potency as a symbol of federal 
power was obvious.  When John Quincy Adams tried to convince the nation 
that the federal government should erect an astronomical observatory, he 
referred to observatories as “light-houses of the skies.”83
Adams’ project, like so many other internal improvement projects, 
failed (temporarily).  But Adams was not the only one to attempt to latch on 
to the precedent created by lighthouses.  Throughout the key internal 
improvement debates of the nation’s first forty years, lighthouses were 
mentioned again and again.  Supporters of federal improvement projects 
touted lighthouses as supporting their interpretation of the Commerce 
80
 American State Papers, Comm. & Nav., vol. 1, ser. 14, no. 85 (Feb. 18, 1804) 
(Report of the Committee of Commerce and Manufacturers on the resolution of the House 
directing an inquiry to be made into the expediency of laying a tonnage duty upon vessels 
entering our ports, for the support of Light Houses).
81
 Story, supra note ___, at § 504.  Note how this compares with Story’s agnosticism 
on whether the Constitution gave the federal government the power to construct roads and 
canals.  See, supra, note ___.
82 See, e.g., Currie, 39 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. at 1500 and n.314 (noting that Jefferson 
did not veto bills financing aids to maritime navigation despite doubts as to their 
constitutionality).  Even James Polk, a foe of federally-sponsored internal improvement 
projects, carved out an exception for lighthouses in his veto message on a harbor and river 
improvement act, based on the “long acquiesence of the government through all preceding 
administrations” to a power exercised “coeval with the constitution.”  29th Cong., 1st sess., 
House Journal at 1210 (Aug. 3, 1846).  Polk’s general constitutional theory regarding 
internal improvements actually echoed the plan proposed long before by Thomas Tucker 
during the Lighthouse Act debate:  to Polk, Congress’ power was limited to giving or 
withholding consent to state imposition of tonnage duties to fund internal improvements.  
John C. Eastman, Restoring the “General” to the General Welfare Clause, 4 Chap. L. Rev. 
73, 85 (Spring 2001). 
83
 Albert Castel, The Founding Fathers and the Vision of a National University, 4 
History of Educ. Quart. 280, 295 (Dec. 1964).  Allen Cole, who has researched Adams’
rhetoric, believes that Adams coined the phrase, though “there is at least one medieval 
reference to observatories as lighthouses in the Picatrix.”  E-mail from A.F. Cole, 
University of Maryland, to the author, dated Sept. 10, 2003 (on file with the author). 
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Clause.  Opponents struggled with how best to avoid the force of such 
precedent.  Examination of the role of lighthouses in the major internal 
improvement debates sheds light on how federal legislators in the early 
years of the republic viewed the role of precedent in interpreting the 
Constitution.  As it turned out, the motives underlying the First Federal 
Congress’ initial steps to take control of the nation’s lighthouses had no 
impact on the precedential weight accorded to lighthouses as an exercise of 
Commerce Clause authority.      
B.  Lighthouses and the use of legislative precedent in Constitutional 
debates in the early republic
1. James Madison:  From the Lighthouse Act of 1789 to a call for a 
Constitutional Amendment
As evidenced by his role in the debate on the Tonnage Act in the 
Spring of 1789, Madison was largely responsible for the federal 
government’s foray into lighthouse operation.  As President, he signed a 
law authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to purchase Winslow Lewis’ 
patent for lighting lighthouses and to contract with Lewis to outfit and 
maintain the United States’ lighthouses for seven years. 84  And yet, setting 
down his views in retirement in 1831, he expressed the need to empower 
the federal government with a constitutional amendment covering “internal 
improvements, embracing Roads, Canals, Light Houses, Harbours, Rivers, 
and other lesser objects.” 85
That is not to say that Madison, looking back in 1831, could not also 
justify lighthouse construction as an exercise of federal power.  But the 
justification he provided (in the same letter proposing the need for a 
constitutional amendment embracing lighthouses) rested largely on past 
practices rather than a bare reading of the Constitution:  
Light Houses having a close and obvious 
relation to navigation and external commerce, 
and to the safety of public as well as private 
ships, and having recd. a positive sanction and 
general acquiescence from the 
commencement of the Federal Government, 
the constitutionality of them is I presume not 
84
 Papers of J. Madison, Pres. Series, vol. 4 at 252 (1999).
85
 Madison to Reynolds Chapman, dated Jan. 6, 1831, reprinted in ___ Writings of 
James Madison 429, 434.
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now to be shaken if it were ever much 
contested.86
As President, Madison had explicitly stated that precedent could be 
used to establish the validity of otherwise arguable constitutional 
constructions.  It was for that reason that he refused to veto the national 
bank on constitutional grounds, even though he personally believed that the 
bank was unconstitutional.87  How remarkable is it, therefore, for Madison 
to call for a constitutional amendment covering lighthouses, despite decades 
of legislative and executive precedent (including precedent he took part in 
creating) that would make their constitutionality otherwise unshakeable?  
Three facts will help us better understand Madison’s position in 1831:
When Jefferson was President, he remembered the Lighthouse Act 
dissent that Madison had evidently forgotten about thirty years later.  And 
he shared the dissenters’ view.  Though he questioned how the Commerce 
Clause could justify creation of coastal navigational aids; though he could 
not see any distinction between building such aids and building factories to 
“facilitate” commerce (which he did not deem to be constitutional); and 
though he believed a constitutional amendment was needed for the federal 
government to build internal improvements—he nonetheless continued 
signing lighthouse-related bills into law, apparently, as one historian has 
concluded, out of a willingness “to let sleeping dogs lie….”88  As President, 
Madison may well have taken the same approach.
Second, during Madison’s presidency, he had already concluded (as 
Jefferson before him) that a constitutional amendment was needed for 
internal improvements in general.89  Indeed, one of his final acts in office 
was vetoing a bill intended to establish a permanent fund for internal 
improvements.90  Madison’s veto message of the so-called “Bonus Bill” 
86 Id. at 435.
87 In vetoing a recharter of the bank in 1815 on nonconstitutional grounds, Madison 
stated that he was “waiving” the question of “constitutional authority” as being precluded 
“by repeated recognitions under varied circumstances of the validity of such an institution 
in acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the Government, accompanied 
by indications, in different modes, of a concurrence of the general will of the nation . . . .”  
Veto Message to the Senate of the United States, Jan. 30, 1815, reprinted in VIII Writings 
of James Madison (Hunt, ed., 1908) 327.
88
 David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress:  Jefferson and the West, 1801-1809, 
39 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1441, n.314 (1998).
89
 John Lauritz Larson, “Bind the Republic Together”:  The National Union and the 
Struggle for a System of Internal Improvements, 74 J. Am. Hist., Issue 2, Sept. 1987, at 371 
n.15, 376 n.24.
90
 Bills and Resolutions, H.R. 29 (1816).  Because the internal improvements fund was 
to be financed by the “bonus” and dividends of the National Bank, the bill is often referred 
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specifically rejected Commerce Clause authority for federal road and canal 
building: 
“The power to regulate commerce among the 
several States,” cannot include a power to 
construct roads and canals, and to improve the 
navigation of watercourses, in order to 
facilitate, promote, and secure such a 
commerce, without a latitude of construction 
departing from the ordinary import of the 
terms, strengthened by the known 
inconveniences which doubtless led to the 
grant of this remedial power to Congress.”91
Madison’s message came after extended congressional debate on the 
matter—debate in which supporters of the bill laid out legislative precedent 
they deemed indicative of federal powers.  Lighthouses had a prominent 
place among that precedent.92  But Madison simply brushed all of the 
proponents’ arguments aside by broadly stating that their position could not 
be justified without “a reliance on insufficient precedents.”93  Though he 
did not attempt to distinguish lighthouses from roads or canals, it may well 
be that in 1817 (contrary to Jefferson) he saw such a distinction as 
appropriate.  However, it may also be true that by 1831 he was not 
confident that any legitimate distinction existed.  Which brings us back to 
the 1831 letter, and our third point.
The reference in Madison’s letter to safety and external commerce 
could logically extend to internal improvements other than lighthouses.  In 
fact, Madison recognized that canals could create channels for foreign 
commerce; that roads could be necessary for troops and military 
transportations (in which cases they “must speak for themselves, as 
occasions arise”); and that rivers requiring removal of obstructions could 
run the gamut from the Mississippi—“the commercial highway for half the 
nation”—to “inconsiderable” streams within one state. 94  Conversely, he 
hinted that not all proposed lighthouse projects may serve the national 
purposes of foreign or interstate commerce. 95
to as the “Bonus Bill.”  
91
 30 Annals of Cong. 211-12 (1817).  Madison also found that the law could not be 
supported by the federal government’s power to provide for the common defense and 
general welfare.  Id. at 212.  
92
 30 Annals of Cong. 859 (1817) (Pickering), 869 (Yates), 889 (Sheffey), and 917 
(Pickering).
93 Id. at 212.
94
 Writings of James Madison at 435-36.
95 Id. at 435 (“the power is liable to great abuse, and [calls] for the most careful & 
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That being the case, what distinction would remain between
lighthouses and other types of internal improvements?  The crucial
categorical distinction in Madison’s letter would appear to be the course of 
history:  Lighthouses received “a positive sanction and general 
acquiescence” since the beginning of the federal government; the other 
forms of improvements did not.  But if the only distinction between them 
were precedent, and not logic, then allowing such “general acquiescence” to 
remove the need for constitutional amendment could hardly be limited to 
lighthouses only; logically, one would think the precedent should apply to 
all analogous improvements.  And so, perhaps, that is why Madison, firm in 
his belief that road and canal building required an amendment, did not 
exempt lighthouses from his call for an amendment even though they had 
already attained an unshakable constitutional status built on precedent.96
By 1831, whether or not precedent could inform constitutional 
construction, and whether or not the precedent of lighthouses were 
indistinguishable from less well-established forms of internal 
improvements, had been the subject of repeated debate in Congress.  
2.  The Use of Precedent in Internal Improvement Debates
By the time the Fourteenth Congress engaged in the drawn out 
debate that preceded passage of the Bonus Bill, each side could point to 
certain actions (or inactions) of prior governments as supporting their 
interpretation of the Constitution.97  That Madison had recently sanctioned 
construction of the Constitution based on precedent was not lost on 
supporters of internal improvements.  But opponents—neither then, nor in 
responsible scrutiny into every particular case before an application be complied with”).
96
 Madison’s letter refers the reader to his 1817 opinion denying the constitutionality 
of internal improvements, explaining that his opinion is still the same “subject, as 
heretofore, to the exception of particular cases, where a reading of the Constitution, 
different from mine may have derived from a continued course of practical sanctions an 
authority sufficient to overrule individual constructions.”  Id. at 433-34.  Lighthouses and 
harbor clean-up projects are the only cases he mentions in the letter as having been 
established by continued positive sanctions.  Could Madison possibly be suggesting that he 
himself, despite his comments in Congress during the Tonnage Act debate in 1789, did not 
necessarily view lighthouses as a constitutional exercise of federal authority—that his view 
on the matter had changed since 1789 (or even since his Presidency)?  Indeed, Madison’s 
earlier veto of the Bonus Bill has been interpreted as a shift by Madison from a more 
flexible republicanism to a strict constructionalism that included a denunciation of his own 
post road arguments from 20 years before that.  John Lauritz Larson, “Bind the Republic 
Together:”  The National Union and the Struggle for a System of Internal Improvements, 
74 Journal of Am. Hist. 363, 382 (Sept. 1987).    
97
 For a summary of the fits and starts of internal improvements prior to that point, see 
Larson, Internal Improvement at 39-63.
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subsequent internal improvement debates—were not about to concede the 
point.  The key internal improvement debates over the next decade routinely 
included argument over whether it was proper to afford any weight to 
precedent in interpreting the Constitution.98
On one side of the debate, legislators expressed a fear that reliance 
on precedent could result in amendment of the Constitution without 
following Article V procedures.  The following comment, made during the 
Bonus Bill debate, is typical of such statements:  
The authority to pass the bill, judging from 
the arguments used, seems to be derived 
rather from precedents than the Constitution.  
This surely cannot be the true way to construe 
that sacred instrument. . . .  If precedents are 
to be the rule of construction, the Constitution 
may be altered without applying to the States; 
and according to it, no amendment may be 
made without their consent.99
98
 Subjects of debate ranged from creating funds for making appropriations to support 
internal improvements; to commission of general surveys for use in future construction of 
internal improvements; to funding, investment in, or construction of specific individual 
projects.  See generally Larson, Internal Improvement at 63-69, Ch.4, and Ch. 5.  Politics 
and sectional/local interests played a large role in the debates, in votes, and in whether 
legislation that made it through Congress ultimately was signed into law.  However, debate 
was not solely “political,” as the internal improvement issue found expression “as a 
constitutional, and not merely a policy, question.”  Harry N. Scheiber, The Transportation 
Revolution and American Law:  Constitutionalism and Public Policy, in Transportation and 
the Early Nation 1, 3 (1982).  For our purposes, the possible motives underlying the 
constitutional arguments described are not as important as the nature of the dialogue itself.  
Generally speaking, though, legislators in favor of internal improvements favored reliance 
on precedent, and those opposed to improvements argued against the use of precedent to 
provide meaning to the Constitution.  Because the nature of the precedent debate did not 
change over time during the period in question, and in fact was largely repetitive of itself, 
regardless of the specific bill being debated, I have illustrated the debate with exemplary 
comments from the various debates.  The debate on the unsuccessful Buffalo to New 
Orleans road, and the debate that led to Andrew Jackson’s veto of the Maysville Road 
bill—both critical blows to attempts to create a federal transportation system, and both of 
which occurred just prior to Madison’s 1831 letter—seemed an appropriate ending point 
for this inquiry into early nineteenth century congressional debate.  See Pamela L. Baker, 
The Washington National Road Bill and the Struggle to Adopt a Federal System of Internal 
Improvement, 22 J. of the Early Republic 438; John C. Eastman, Restoring the “General” 
to the General Welfare Clause, 4 Chapman L. Rev. 63, 83 (2001); for additional 
background on the period see Larson, Internal Improvement at 183-91.
99
 30 Annals of Cong. 178 (1817)(Hardin).  See, e.g., 31 Annals of Cong. 1139 
(1818)(A. Smyth) (if precedent is unconstitutional, that is not grounds for acting 
unconstitutionally now);  5 Reg. Deb. 254 (1829)(Barbour:  new power requires 
amendment).
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Such argument against precedent really had two components:  First, a 
concern over the nature of the American Constitution and a rejection of 
eighteenth century conceptions of constitutional change.  As Virginia’s 
Alexander Smyth put it, if Congressional power could be extended by 
construction, then the Constitution “will be no better than that of England, 
where the rule of construction is, that whatever has been done may be done 
again.”100
Second, those arguing against reliance on precedent were concerned 
about the legislature’s appropriate place among the three co-ordinate 
branches of federal government:  “Gentlemen have said that Congress, by 
its enactments, has settled the constitutional power of the Government in 
relation to internal improvements.  Can Congress confer a new power?  Can 
Congress rule the Constitution?”101  This was not just a question of whether 
Congress had the ability to resolve Constitutional questions.  The role of a 
legislature, said Virginia’s Philip P. Barbour, was fundamentally different 
from that of a court.  Whereas courts rely on precedent in order to have a 
fixed rule of construction, Barbour argued, it is the legislature’s role to 
declare what the law shall be—not what it is.  That is, legislatures can pass 
laws that change prior ones, and should not be bound by what came 
before.102
Internal improvement supporters met the opponents on every front.  
With respect to the Article V issue, by 1830 they were even partially aided 
by Alexander Smyth, who had changed his earlier views on precedent and 
was now willing to concede that relying on precedent to establish the 
practice of appropriating money for internal improvement projects did not 
subvert the amendment process because repeated legislative practice 
constituted a construction of the Constitution by the people’s 
representatives, implicitly sanctioned by the people themselves.103  Indeed, 
100
 31 Annals of Cong. 1146 (1818.) (Smyth, A.); id. at 1163 (Barbour)(distinguishing 
the United States from Britain). 
101
 6 Reg. Deb. 730 (1830) (Angel); 31 Annals of Cong. 1227 (1818) (Johnson) 
(questioning whether “usurpation of power” by the legislature that “has not been resisted 
by force” should be permitted to amount to legislative adjudication).
102
 31 Annals of Cong. 1163 (1818).
103
 6 Reg. Deb. 680 (1830) (Smyth).  That concept is an echo of federalism arguments 
made during the founding.  Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political 
Safeguards of Federalism, 100 Col. L. Rev. 1, 263-64 (2000).  Despite his sanctioning of 
repeated Congressional action as having the approval of both the state legislatures and the 
people, Smyth did pointedly query whether ¾ of the state legislatures would actually admit 
the power to appropriate funds for road building—suggesting he was not completely 
comfortable with his own argument.  As for federal construction of roads, Smyth still 
maintained his constitutional objection to such action, as he saw no precedent establishing 
a different interpretation. 
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ignoring the different hurdles for passing laws and passing amendments, 
one Congressman suggested that any improper assertion of power by the 
national government could be changed by amendment—and a failure to 
exercise that amendment power signified a “fair presumption” that the 
power had not been improperly asserted.104
But more fundamentally, those in favor of reliance on legislative 
precedent contended that reliance did not trigger Article V concerns because 
each legislative act (whether past or present) was no more than 
Congressional interpretation of the Constitution—and Congress was (in 
their view) fully authorized to engage in such interpretive behavior.  As one 
member of the House put it, Congress was obligated to decide the 
constitutional question “according to our conscience, and not refer the 
matter to State decision.”105  There was no provision in the Constitution, he 
added, referring doubtful questions to the States.106
In that regard, pro-precedent speakers equated Congressional power 
to judicial powers of interpretation.  For example, one representative, 
pointing out that courts do not pass judgment on every piece of legislation 
that gets enacted, argued that where the legislature itself must judge a law’s 
validity, it should be able to make use of the same interpretive tools 
available to the judiciary:  
An appropriation of money to particular 
objects may be effected by a bill, which may 
happen to be carried into execution without 
passing the ordeal of an examination by the 
judiciary.  But, after gentlemen admit that the 
judiciary may decide on our Constitutional 
powers, that the judiciary, in making that 
decision, will adhere to precedents, and, 
consequently, that precedents have authority 
whenever an impartial and learned umpire can 
intervene with its authority; will they contend 
that, in every case where peculiar 
circumstances enable us to carry a measure 
into execution without the aid of the judiciary, 
and where, of course, we must determine the 
104
 32 Annals of Cong. 1326 (1818) (Tucker).  Another member of the Virginia 
delegation expressed a fear that invoking the amendment process as a mode of 
constitutional construction could itself create a harmful precedent.  31 Annals of Cong.
1286 (Mercer).      
105
 Id. at 1120 (Tucker).
106
 Id.
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validity of the power ourselves, precedents 
are to be rejected?  How happens it that 
precedent shall have force in settling the 
validity of one Constitutional power, and be 
rejected when the question arises on 
another?107
Indeed, the equation of legislative precedent to judicial precedent was so 
strong that one debater went so far as to say that “res judicata” foreclosed 
the opponents’ arguments.108
Which is not to say that the supporters of precedent were not wary 
of pressing the point too far.  Although they could point to Madison’s 
position on the national bank to justify reliance on precedent, they still had 
to wrestle with the problem of whether an unconstitutional “error” could 
somehow become constitutional simply by dint of having been enacted and 
enforced.  Those who opposed reliance on precedent illustrated the point by 
invoking the Alien and Sedition laws—laws that no one at the time would 
be eager to sanction with precedential authority.109  Speakers on the other 
side of the debate staked out a more defensible stance enabling them to 
deflect such concerns:  precedent did not replace the “positive and written 
principles of the Constitution;” rather it furnished “better evidence of the 
true interpretation of the Constitution than the most refined and subtle 
arguments.”110  No doubt  having the solid precedent of coastal navigational 
aids in mind, one legislator characterized prior practices as “landmarks for 
subsequent legislatures”—“the buoys which the wisdom of the nation has 
fixed, to mark out the channel that divides the rival jurisdictions.”111
107
 32 Annals of Cong. 1341 (1818)(Pindall).  See also 31 Annals of Cong. 1131 
(1818)(executive and legislative exercise of power may be considered “so many decisions
on the instrument or law itself”) (emphasis added) (B. Smith). 
108
 30 Annals of Cong. 878 (1817)(Gold) (“is everything to be in flux and the benefit 
of precedent to have no place here?”); see 32 Annals of Cong. 1343 (1818)(Pindall) 
(stating that the “unusual course” of denying precedent all authority is a “position 
involving the endless absurdity of forcing us to ten thousand decisions of a Constitutional 
question, which, after all, according to [that] theory would leave the same question 
undecided through all futurity”).
109 Id. at 168 (Daggett), 178 (Macon); 31 Annals of Cong. 1229-30 (1818)(Johnson).
110
 30 Annals of Cong. 856 (1817)(Calhoun); see also 32 Annals of Cong. 1325 
(1818)(Tucker:  “I do not contend . . . that we are bound by legislative precedents against 
the clear meaning of the Constitution.  But I do contend, that when a principle has been 
long avowed and admitted, and acted upon, we ought not entirely to disregard it in deciding 
on a doubtful point.”); 31 Annals of Cong. 1176 (1818) (Clay:  agreeing that prior exercise 
of power should not answer the issue).
111
 32 Annals of Cong. 1325 (1818)(Tucker).
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In sum, the internal improvement debates reflect years of repeated 
disputes over the nature of the Constitution, the force of legislative 
precedent, and Congress’ role in interpreting the Constitution and causing 
Constitutional change.  Alexander Smyth’s personal shift from 1818 to 
1830 is reflective of the overall direction in which Congress was heading, 
though there were still dissenters.
But even as those questions were being debated, the “landmarks” 
and “buoys” of lighthouses and other navigational aids continued pushing 
the Commerce Clause debate.  Even those opposed to reliance on precedent 
had to contend with the fact that every Congress since the very first one had 
provided for them.  The reality of the situation was that the parameters of 
the Commerce Clause had already moved; the real question to be fought 
over was by how much.112
3. Lighthouse As Commerce Clause Precedent For 
Defining “Regulate” To Include The Power To “Facilitate”
For those who believed that the Commerce Clause did not empower 
the federal government to create internal improvements, an obvious focal 
point was the meaning of the word “regulate.”113  But those who would 
contend that regulate meant simply to prescribe rules for, and not to 
112
 Over the years, additional non-lighthouse precedents were developed, most 
prominent among them being the Cumberland Road, whose origins stemmed from a 
compact that created the state of Ohio.  Leonard D. White, The Jeffersonians 484 (1959).  
Though the slow but sure accretion of road and canal-related precedents was significant, 
debaters in favor of improvements supported the projects with additional powers besides 
the Commerce Clause (such as military, postal, or spending clause powers), while those 
opposed to improvements had numerous grounds for distinguishing them (e.g. they 
involved appropriations, or federal investments, rather than federal construction; or they 
were put in place without any constitutional debate).  Such distinctions often provided the 
constitutional basis for individual and congressional determinations.  See Larson, Internal 
Improvement at 118 (table of resolutions voted on by the 15th Congress; power to 
appropriate funds for improvements was approved; power to build roads or canals was 
rejected); Eastman, Restoring the “General” to the General Welfare Clause, 4 Chapman L. 
Rev. 63, 82-3 (2001) (noting Monroe’s change of mind on the constitutionality of 
appropriations for internal improvements); 6 Reg. Deb. 680 (Smyth) (finding precedent 
supporting spending, but not construction).  Because the federal lighthouse system was 
almost universally accepted as an exercise of Commerce Clause authority, and because it 
represented the most repeated, unchallenged, precedent for construction of, and not just 
appropriations for, internal improvements, the development of Commerce Clause precedent 
is seen most clearly through legislator’s comments about lighthouses.  That is not to say, 
however, that other precedent had no influence on the issues discussed with respect to 
lighthouses.    
113 See, e.g., statements that to “regulate” did not mean to “facilitate”:  30 Annals of 
Cong. 897 (1817); 31 Annals of Cong. 1133 (1818); id. at 1139; id. at 1158.
38 Adam Grace [18-Mar-04]
facilitate, faced a significant problem:  the routine construction and 
operation of lighthouses belied such a narrow reading of the Commerce 
Clause.114  Whatever theoretical arguments could be formulated against the 
use of precedent, the problem for those who opposed federal road and canal 
programs was that they had simultaneously been party to Congress’ 
continued support of lighthouses.  If they could not logically distinguish 
their views on the different categories of improvements, all the 
constitutional theory in the world was not going to help their cause.  
And so, the debate shifted beyond the meaning of “regulate” to 
include argument on the scope of regulated activity.  To argue in the face of 
lighthouse precedent that Congress could not “facilitate” commerce was 
almost impossible.  Instead (though perhaps not much less difficult of an 
argument), internal improvement opponents tried to draw the best bright 
line they could between lighthouses and roads and canals.  Thus, they 
characterized lighthouse building as an appropriate exercise of Commerce 
Clause authority because it concerned the regulation of foreign (or 
“external”) commerce.115
The external/internal commerce distinction could perhaps have had 
practical merit (for example, in weeding out proposed improvements that 
might only serve local, rather than national, interests).  And it certainly 
could explain why the federal government needed to be involved in 
lighthouse construction (given the importance of national control over 
anything that could impact foreign trade).  But as a matter of Constitutional 
interpretation, Congressmen on the other side of the debate had little trouble 
pointing out the lack of textual support for a distinction between foreign and 
interstate commerce.116  This retort by then-Federalist Joseph Hemphill of 
Pennsylvania was typical: 
To regulate commerce with foreign nations . . 
. we have erected lighthouses, piers, buoys, 
and beacons. . . .
     What is the object of these lighthouses and 
light-ships, and this class of powers 
constantly exercised by Congress?  Is it not to 
114 See, e.g., citations to lighthouses as precedent for power to facilitate commerce:  30 
Annals of Cong. 869 (1817); id. at 889-90; 31 Annals of Cong. 1131 (1818); id. at 1176; id.
at 1189; 40 Annals of Cong. 621 (1823); id. at 1106; 6 Reg. Deb. 644 (1830); id. at 662.
115 See, e.g., 30 Annals of Cong. 864 (1817); 31 Annals of Cong.. at 1139 (1818); see 
also 6 Reg. Deb. 699 (1830) (characterizing pre-1815 federal government as focused on 
external affairs, and decrying as “internal and essentially vicious” federal action since 
then).
116 See, e.g., 31 Annals of Cong. 457 (1818); id. at 1131; id. at 1176; 5 Reg. Deb. 279-
80 (1829); 6 Reg. Deb. 644 (1830); id. at 662.
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lessen the price of transportation, by 
removing dangers and rendering the 
navigation more safe and secure?  . . . And 
when we find the power to regulate commerce 
among the States, given by the same sentence, 
and expressed by the same words, why can 
we not apply the principle to the regulation of 
commerce among the States?  Why can we 
not lessen the price of transportation?  Can 
any man living make a sensible distinction?117
Picking up on the flawed distinction between foreign and interstate 
commerce, Henry Clay attacked the apparent self-interested bias of 
representatives from coastal states who routinely benefited from lighthouses 
but would now invoke the Constitution to deny roads and canals to the rest
of the country.118  For Clay, it was not so much a matter of adherence to 
precedent, but a matter of Congressional fairness.  If the government 
exercised its power for one interest, it should not say that the power cannot 
be exercised for another analogous interest:  Having erected lighthouses to 
facilitate foreign commerce, Congress had a “bounden duty” to either repeal 
all the lighthouse laws (if they truly were unconstitutional) or enact similar 
ones to benefit internal commerce.119
Repeal of lighthouse laws did not happen.120  For complicated 
reasons, including not just Congressional but Presidential politics, the
national government moved slowly in providing the fairness sought by Clay 
117
 40 Annals of Cong. 621 (1823).
118
 31 Annals of Cong. 1169 (1818)(“Foreign commerce … is the spoilt child daughter 
of this Government.  We deck her out in the most precious and costly jewels; we light up 
her way by Winslow Lewis’ inventions . . . But when the old respectable matron 
Agriculture asks us for something for her accommodation, gentlemen will not give her a 
gown even of Virginia cloth.”).  See also 6 Reg. Deb. 711 (1830) (“it does seem to me that 
some gentlemen think that constitution, commerce, and every thing stops with tide water”).  
A regional breakdown of the voting on a series of internal improvement-related resolutions 
in the Fifteenth Congress can be found in Larson, Internal Improvements at 118.
119
 31 Annals of Cong. 1176 (1818).  Though of course politically motivated, Clay’s 
theory that Congress should apply the Constitution fairly to all parties is in essence a 
statement of  “legislative adjudication:”   whether or not precedent could be deemed 
“binding” under the Constitution, it was imperative that Congressional resolutions (or 
“adjudications”) of similar funding issues be consistent with each other.   See, supra, note 
___.      
120
 Even James Polk, the staunchest Presidential enemy of internal improvement 
projects, carved out an exception for lighthouses.  See, supra, note ___.  Though Andrew 
Jackson before him expressed fears over abuses in lighthouse projects, he also did not 
categorically reject them.
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and other supporters of broad internal improvement programs.121  But the 
fits and starts in putting in place a national system of roads and canals 
should not obscure the way the constitutional debate had shifted in the 
meantime.  The foundation for defining the power to “regulate” commerce 
as including the power to “facilitate” was firmly laid with the Lighthouse 
Act of 1789.  Unless Congress were either to reverse course or afford no 
precedential value to its steady legislative practices, those arguing that 
“regulate” meant no more than to “prescribe” or “direct” would face an 
uphill battle.122
The locus for the early solidification of Commerce Clause authority 
is generally placed in Justice Marshall’s hands.123  Interestingly enough, 
members of Congress used Marshall’s opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden to 
support their argument that construction of lighthouses and other internal 
improvements could not constitute the exercise of Commerce Clause power 
because (as Marshall had said) states and individuals could engage in such 
activities, too.124  The neutralization of that portion of Marshall’s opinion 
came through the other branches’ giving definition to the word “regulate” 
through the continuous enactment of lighthouse-related laws, supported by 
repeated reliance on the Commerce Clause as their authority for doing so.     
II. EARLY FEDERAL LIGHTHOUSE ADMINISTRATION AND THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF EMINENT DOMAIN LAW
As we saw above, the Lighthouse Act’s provision for state consent 
stemmed from the Enclave Clause, which provided a mechanism for the 
federal acquisition of exclusive jurisdiction over property within state 
boundaries.  When the federal government took over the existing 
lighthouses starting in 1789, the individual states ceded both title and 
jurisdiction to the federal government simultaneously.  But as the federal 
lighthouse program grew in the 1790s, and new lighthouses were 
constructed, the states did not always own title to the property on which the 
121 See generally Larson, Internal Improvement at 45-69, 109-93; Stephen Minicucci, 
The “Cement of Interest,” 25 Social Science History 247 (2001).
122
 Regarding the weight placed on non-judicial Constitutional precedent, it is worth 
noting that even opponents of internal improvements ended up relying on precedent-based 
arguments.  Thus, Alexander Smyth contended that the “long nonuser” of a power to build 
roads is “evidence that it is not contained in the [Constitution’s] grant; and we should now 
consider it as settled, that Congress have not power to enter into a state, assume 
jurisdiction, and construct roads.”  6 Reg. Deb. 680 (1830).  See id. at 766 (Hubbard).
123
 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) 1 (1824).
124
 32 Annals of Cong. 1358 (1818)(Orr); 6 Reg. Deb. 839-40 (1830).  See also
Gibbons at __ (“What is this power?  It is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the 
rule by which commerce is to be governed.”).
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federal government wished to build.  That state of affairs potentially raised 
two questions:  If a private land owner refused to transfer its land, did the 
federal government have power to obtain title through condemnation?  If so, 
could a state affect the federal government’s rights by refusing to cede 
jurisdiction over the property in question?    
Fast forward to 1875.  In Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875), 
the Supreme Court conclusively ruled that the federal government had the 
power to take private property (provided, of course, that just compensation 
is made in accordance with the Fifth Amendment.125  And case law from the 
period clearly distinguished between federal acquisition of soil (which a 
state could not prevent) and federal acquisition of jurisdiction (which 
required state consent) 126—effectively meaning that if the federal 
government did want “exclusive” jurisdiction, it would have to comply with 
the wishes of a state that refused to cede jurisdiction if eminent domain
powers were exercised.
The question is, what happened in the 86 years between the birth of 
constitutional government and the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in 
1875.  Was it understood that the federal government could take property by 
eminent domain?  If not, why not? 
A.  The Enclave Clause’s Effect On Precedent
On September 6, 1797, a group of men gathered at Webbs Tavern in 
Salem, Massachusetts, for a boat ride to nearby Baker’s Island.  The group 
included the United States Superintendent of Lighthouses in Massachusetts, 
an attorney for the owner of Baker’s Island, and the members of a 
committee appointed by a state court judge “to view, sett off and appraise” 
ten acres of land on the island, for use by the United States as a site for a 
new lighthouse.  Foul weather prevented the group from undertaking their 
trip, but less than a week later the committee members succeeded in 
viewing the land and arriving at an appropriate appraised value.127  In 
October, the state court accepted the committee’s report, 128 and the United 
125 Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875).
126 See, e.g., Ex Parte Hebard, 11 F. Cas. 1010, 1011 (D. Kan. 1877) (state consent not 
required for valid exercise of eminent domain, but state shall not be ousted of jurisdiction 
except by her consent); Stockton v. Baltimore & N.Y. R.R., 32 F. 9, 18 (D.N.J. 
1887)(same). 
127
 The court document setting forth all of this information can be found at pages 205-
06 of NARA Microfilm Roll M94.
128 Id.
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States completed what may well have been its first taking of private 
property.
As history unfolded, the Baker’s Island taking bore two 
characteristics that would be repeated for decades:  the valuation process 
was overseen by a state court, and it was explicitly authorized not by act of 
Congress, but by the Massachusetts state law ceding jurisdiction over 
whatever land would become the Baker’s Island lighthouse.129  Indeed, 
according to the established history of takings, up until the 1870s the 
exercise of federal eminent domain power within state borders occurred 
generally in state proceedings and always with state legislative 
involvement—a pattern of conduct not altered until the Supreme Court’s 
Kohl decision upheld a federal court condemnation proceeding and strongly 
confirmed the federal government’s independent power of eminent 
domain.130  This large gap in time from the founding to the 1870s has been 
129
 The statute reads, in relevant part:
Be it enacted . . . That the United States of America, may purchase or 
take as hereinafter is provided, any tracts of Land which shall be found 
necessary and convenient for the Light-houses authorized by Congress 
to be erected upon Baker’s Island, and upon Cape Cod . . . .
. . .
And be it further enacted, That if the Agent or person employed for the 
United States, and the Owner or Owners of any Tract or Tracts of Land 
which shall be found necessary and convenient for the said Light-houses 
cannot agree in a sale and purchase thereof, such Agent or Person 
employed may apply to any Court of General Sessions of the Peace 
which shall be holden within and for the county wherein such land 
lies, who shall and may appoint a Committee, of three Freeholders, 
impartial men, to determine a just equivalent to the Owner or Owners 
of such Land, which committee shall be sworn before some Justice 
of the Peace for the faithful discharge of their trust; and shall forthwith 
proceed to view, set off and appraise such Tract or Tracts of Land; and 
shall make return of their doings to the same Court; and which award 
and return being accepted by the Court and the amount of such 
appraisement being paid to the Owner or Owners of the Land appraised 
and set off by such Committee . . . the Tract or Tracts of Land so 
appraised and set off, shall be vested in the United States, and shall 
and may be taken, possessed and appropriated for the purposes 
aforesaid.  Provided, That all charges of such application and 
appraisement shall be paid by the United States, and Provided that 
the Land which may be set off for the purposes of this Act, shall 
not exceed the quantity of ten acres in the whole for each Lighthouse, 
including and reckoning therewith, any Land purchased for the same.
Mass., ch. 23, June 18, 1796.
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 Julius L. Sackman, 1 Nichols on Eminent Domain (revised 3d ed.) § 1.24 (2002); 
Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875).  From early on, however, federal takings power 
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attributed to the presence of doubt regarding whether or not the federal 
government possessed eminent domain power.131  It is a theory that bears 
re-examination.
On the one hand, it is true that the federal government’s power to 
take property within state borders, without state consent, was questioned by 
some during the 19th century.  Even James Monroe, in arguing against 
federal authority to construct internal improvements, suggested that “very 
few would concur” that the federal government, in attempting to obtain land 
for purposes of internal improvement projects, could summon a jury to 
condemn the land and compel a transfer for value.132  But it is difficult to 
believe that federal officials in the 1790s would not have understood the 
(recently enacted) “just compensation” limitation of the Takings Clause as 
an implicit recognition of federal eminent domain power.133  That is the 
only sensible reading of the clause, and two Supreme Court Justices 
explicitly recognized the power in 1798—one of them stating that the 
absence of such a power would obstruct the operations of government 
because “Fortifications, Light-houses, and other public edifices, are 
necessarily sometimes built upon the soil owned by individuals.”134
was routinely exercised in federal court when the land being acquired was situated within 
the District of Columbia.  1 Nichols at § 1.24.  
131
 As the lead treatise on Eminent Domain explains:  “Originally there was some 
doubt with respect to the power of eminent domain in the federal government since, it was 
argued, the United States is a government of delegated powers and the power of eminent 
domain had not been specifically granted in the federal constitution.”  1 Nichols at § 1.24.
See Gary Lawson and Guy Seidman, Taking Notes:  Subpoenas and Just Compensation, 66 
U. Chi. L. Rev. 1081, 1087 n.18 (“The existence of a federal power of eminent domain was 
a matter of some controversy in the founding era.”); William B. Stoebuck, A General 
Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 Wash. L. Rev. 553, 559 n.18 (Aug. 1972) (“Strangely, it 
was not until [the Kohl] decision that the federal government was clearly determined to 
have eminent domain power.”).
132
 VI Writings of James Monroe (Stanislaus Murray Hamilton, ed.) 216, 233 (“Views 
on the Subject of Internal Improvements”).  See, e.g., 31 Annals of Cong. 1209 (1818) 
(Austin); 32 Annals of Cong. 1351 (Orr); 40 Annals of Cong. 709 (1823) (Wood).  See also
Gilmer v. Lime Point, 18 Cal. 229 (1861) (counsel argued that the United States lacks the 
right of eminent domain without State consent; court noted it was not deciding the issue).
133 See Matthew P. Harrington, “Public Use” and the Original Understanding of the 
So-Called “Takings” Clause, 53 Hastings L.J. 1245, 1287 (Aug. 2002) (stating that “far 
from being a grant of power, Madison’s eminent domain clause was an attempt to define 
the nature of a power already inhering in the national legislature”).  
134
 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 400 (1798) (Iredell, J.).  In Calder, Justices Chase and 
Iredell both referred to the government’s power to take property as a reason for limiting the 
scope of the Constitution’s prohibition against ex post facto laws.  Id. at 394 (Chase, J.); 
400 (Iredell, J., concurring in result).  Although the case involved an act by a state 
legislature, both justices applied their reasoning to the federal government’s powers:
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Moreover, although the evidence is scant, early lighthouse-related 
correspondence of Treasury Department officials suggests that they did 
understand themselves to be empowered to take property without state 
consent or state-mandated procedures.135
It is beyond the scope of this article to identify the reasons that some 
nineteenth century politicians either doubted federal eminent domain 
authority, or simply refrained from exercising it in court proceedings 
without state involvement.  However, it is likely that both political thinking 
and policy were significantly shaped by the Enclave Clause’s requirement 
that the federal government obtain state consent before exercising exclusive 
jurisdiction over federal lands.136  Indeed, the procedural pattern established 
by the Baker Island taking arose out of the Enclave Clause’s consent 
requirement.  And it is a pattern that outlasted the Kohl case, being used 
even after the Supreme Court had approved independent federal takings in 
federal court.137  We turn now to examine the birth of that pattern.
It is not to be presumed, that the federal or state legislatures will pass 
laws to deprive citizens of rights vested in them by existing laws; unless 
for the benefit of the whole community; and on making full satisfaction.  
The restraint against making any ex post facto laws was not considered, 
by the framers of the constitution, as extending to prohibit the depriving 
a citizen even of a vested right to property; or the provision, ‘that private 
property should not be taken for PUBLIC use, without just compensation,’ 
was unnecessary.
Id. at 394 (Chase, J.); see id. at 400 (Iredell, J.). 
135 See, infra, ___.
136 See 31 Annals of Cong. 1135 (Clagett) (saying that federal government could not 
take possession of land—or even purchase it—without state consent).  During the 1864 
debates of Maryland’s (new) Constitutional Convention, the Enclave Clause’s requirement 
of state consent was cited as support for an argument that the federal government did not 
have the power to condemn lands within a state absent state consent.  Debates of the 
Constitutional Convention of the State of Maryland, vol. I at 458.  See also Cong. Globe 
(Apr. 19, 1860) at 1790-92 (Senate debate regarding bill that would have established a 
procedure for taking property, with consent of the state legislature); Mark L. Pollot, Grand 
Theft and Petit Larceny:  Property Rights in America 44 (1993) (stating that the federal 
Constitution does not expressly grant the power of eminent domain, unless one considers 
the Enclave Clause “to be a modified extension of the power of eminent domain”); Ellen 
Paul Frankel, Property Rights and Eminent Domain 73 (1987) (stating that the Enclave 
Clause “appeared to limit federal takings to an indirect course, one that would require the 
‘Consent of the Legislature of the State’ in which the property lies.”).
137 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 520-21 (1883) (noting two examples 
of recent state legislation providing for takings to be exercised in accordance with state 
law); In re Petition of the United States, 96 N.Y. 227 (1884) (stating that despite its 
independent condemnation powers, federal government may enter state courts and 
condemn land through proceedings authorized by the state legislature).
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In the 1790s, when the federal government obtained either existing 
lighthouse lands or lands for new lighthouse construction, it always sought 
a jurisdictional cession over such lands from the state.138  The state acts 
providing such cession sometimes included conditions accompanying the 
state’s consent.139  The 1796 act passed by the Massachusetts General Court 
with respect to Baker’s Island was no different in that regard.
In reading the act’s provision that the United States may “purchase 
or take [land on Baker’s Island] as hereinafter is provided,” it would be 
natural to view that provision as a grant of takings power to the federal 
government.140  But the key words are “as hereinafter is provided.”  
Massachusetts was not granting power to the United States—it was limiting 
it.  If land was to be taken by the federal government, state mandated 
procedures would have to be adhered to, including a requirement that all 
charges related to the appraisement proceeding by paid by the United 
States.141  And, of course, the state’s power to impose these conditions on 
the federal government stemmed directly from the power under the Enclave 
Clause to withhold its consent to federal jurisdiction.
When the federal government set out to obtain land for the Baker’s 
Island light, the official in charge was Tench Coxe, then Commissioner of 
Revenue in the Treasury Department.142  Despite the clear process provided 
138 See, e.g., Act of Apr. 12, 1792, ch. 12, 2d Cong., 1st sess.; T. Coxe to A. Hamilton, 
Jan. 19, 1793, reprinted in XIII Syrett 503; House Journal, 3d Cong., 1st sess., p.46 (Jan. 
21, 1794); Act of Mar. 2, 1795, ch. 40, 3rd Cong., 2d sess.; T. Coxe to Isaac Holmes, June 
15, 1796 (NARA M63, roll 1).
139 See, e.g., Mass. Statutes 1790, ch. 4 (June 10, 1790) (conditioning cession on state 
retention of jurisdiction for service of process, continued federal operation of the lights, 
and compensation for lands ceded if other states given the same); V Statutes at Large of 
South Carolina (Cooper ed.) 147 (1839) (Act No. 1486, Jan. 20, 1790) (U.S. must maintain 
lights in good repair, and place leading marks and buoys); Laws of Virginia (Henning, ed.), 
1789 ch. 5 (Nov. 19, 1789) (cession conditioned upon U.S. completing erection of light in 
seven years).
140
 Mass. Ch. XXIII, June 18, 1796.
141 Id.  At the time, it could not have been clear to the Massachusetts legislature what 
procedures the federal government might have followed had it attempted to take the land.  
Takings were generally understood to be an exercise of legislative authority, with 
compensation and procedures governed by legislative, not judicial, rule.  Matthew P. 
Harrington, “Public Use” and the Original Understanding of the So-Called “Takings” 
Clause, 53 Hastings L.J. 1245, 1247, 1263, 1277 (Aug. 2002); William Michael Treanor, 
The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 Colum. L. 
Rev. 782, 794 n.69 (1995); Jacques B. Gelin and David W. Miller, The Federal Law of 
Eminent Domain §1.2 (1982).  Indeed, the Massachusetts statute is a typical example of 
that.
142
 In a wonderful bit of irony, Coxe was the “Freeman” who penned the articles 
assuring nervous readers that the Constitution did not empower the federal government to 
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by the Massachusetts statute, Coxe was not at all anxious to resort to 
condemnation.  As he told his superintendent of lighthouses in 
Massachusetts, “[i]t will be much more agreeable to procure the land by 
treaty and ordinary purchase than to adopt the mode of valuation or 
condemnation to the Public use, for an appraised consideration, as 
authorized by the State law.”143
The concern was not one of federal-state relations (the state 
legislature had already given its stamp of approval to condemnation) but 
one of federal-private citizen relations.  Although Coxe was always anxious 
to keep costs down, including acquiring lands by gift if at all possible, his 
correspondence also reflects vigilance in avoiding any behavior that would 
make the federal government appear unfair in dealing with members of the 
public.144  Thus, even when push eventually came to shove at Baker’s 
Island and Coxe had to authorize use of Massachusetts’ takings procedure, 
he authorized the lighthouse superintendent to agree “to give what three 
good men will fix upon it,” if that were “more agreeable” to the owner than 
the non-consensual condemnation proceeding; and he also specified that 
“[r]ather than incommode him, half an acre may be taken.”145
From the Baker’s Island correspondence alone, it is not entirely 
clear whether Coxe would have considered himself empowered to condemn 
the land absent the Massachusetts’ statute.  Indeed, he had just allowed his 
superintendent in New York to be put through the ringer of exceedingly 
difficult negotiations with the owners of land in Montauk, without any 
indication that he could, if he wished, simply resort to a condemnation 
proceeding.146  However, in February 1797—after Coxe was familiar with 
engage in such traditional state activities as building lighthouses.  See supra note __.
143
 Tench Coxe to Benjamin Lincoln, dated July 8, 1796 (NARA microfilm role M63, 
roll 1).
144
 Tench Coxe to Nicholas Fish, dated May 27, 1795 (NARA microfilm roll M63, roll 
1) (regarding land for Montauk lighthouse:  “It is true, that the land in this instance appears 
to be above the medium quality of the Sea Coast, and therefore it is more agreeable, that a 
Nation should pay a reasonable price, than accept a small gift from Individuals”); Tench 
Coxe to Peleg Coffin, dated July 29, 1795 (NARA microfilm roll M63, roll 1) (writing to 
an oil seller haggling over price:  “The Treasury has no interest in this Business.  We form 
our minds as the equitable arbitrators between the Community and the Citizen.”); Tench 
Coxe to Nicholas Fish, dated Sept. 12, 1795 (NARA microfilm roll M63, roll 1) (“the 
Government do not wish to obtain the land below its just value”); Tench Coxe to Benjamin 
Lincoln, dated Dec. 20, 1796 (NARA microfilm roll M63, roll 1) (saying that quantity of 
land could be reduced if desired by the owner “[i]n order to make the matter as little 
inconvenient to the owner as possible”).
145
  Tench Coxe to Benjamin Lincoln, Mar. 1, 1797 (NARA microfilm roll M63, roll 
1).
146 See correspondence from Tench Coxe to Nicholas Fish, dated Apr. 10, 1795; May 
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the Baker’s Island statute, and just as things were heating up with the 
Baker’s Island owner—Coxe instructed his superintendent of lighthouses in 
Rhode Island to consider condemning the land on which the Newport 
Lighthouse was situated:
It is wished, that you would endeavor to 
procure the Soil:—
1st by treaty with the owner, or
2dly by taking measures to procure the land 
upon a just valuation of a Jury under the 
authority of law, in that manner which is 
understood to be called “condemning land” in 
the Eastern states.—147
What makes Coxe’s suggestion significant is that at the time he 
made it, Rhode Island had already ceded jurisdiction over the property, and 
there was no Rhode Island statute authorizing or consenting to a 
condemnation proceeding by the United States.  Whether Baker’s Island 
planted the seed of eminent domain in Coxe’s mind, or whether after both 
Montauk and Baker’s Island his patience had worn thin, Coxe’s Newport 
letter indicates that at the time it was written (1) Coxe did not view state 
consent as a prerequisite to federal exercise of eminent domain power; and 
(2) once the state had consented to a cession of jurisdiction—the only object 
for which state consent is required by the Constitution—resort to 
condemnation would not cause Coxe to return to the state legislature for 
additional approval.  Neither of which is to say that Coxe felt unconstrained 
in using federal condemnation power.  He did feel constrained—but the 
constraints appear to have stemmed from a fear of antagonizing private 
citizens, rather than from a belief that the federal government lacked power 
without state legislative consent.148
26, 1795; Sept. 12, 1795 (NARA microfilm roll M63, roll 1).  In the last letter, Coxe, 
authorized his superintendent to raise their offer, but his exasperation at the owners’ 
“unhandsome conduct” was clearly reaching its limits:
But as good and reasonable men should abide by their own offers
or first askings, and as the Government do not wish to obtain the 
land below its just value, it is earnestly hoped, that no obligation 
may be imposed by the owners upon the Government to give a 
price which may render them apparently inattentive to the proper 
value of things and careless of the Public Money.
147
 Tench Coxe to Wm Ellery, Feb. 28, 1797 (NARA microfilm roll M63, roll 1).
148
 Coxe’s letter regarding the Newport lighthouse stresses that it is “particularly 
desirable” not to resort to a just valuation if it can be avoided, and that paying “a liberal 
price” would be better “than to recur to Court and Jury.”  Id.  Despite Coxe’s professed 
willingness to pay a “liberal price,” one wonders whether Coxe may also have been 
nervous that a valuation proceeding could lead to imposition of an unfair price by a jury 
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The evidence under Coxe’s successor, William Miller, is similar.  
After the State of Virginia ceded jurisdiction to the United States for 
construction of a new lighthouse at New Point Comfort, the Treasury 
Department found itself dealing with an unreasonable land owner.  
Although the state law contained no authorization of condemnation 
proceedings, the local federal official raised the prospect of resorting to 
one—but summarily dismissed it out of fears that the federal government 
would find itself mistreated:  “As far as I can discover, there seems in that 
neighborhood a general disposition to make the United States pay well for 
the scite of a Lighthouse, and I suspect that even a jury from that vicinity, 
under a writ of ad quod damnum, would estimate the price not by the real 
value of the article, but by the ability of the purchaser, the Public.”149
On the other hand, in a situation where the State of New Jersey had 
not yet ceded jurisdiction, Miller wrote the following as his agent wrestled 
with a stubbornly unfair bargainer:
If the Mercantile interest of New York 
were to represent to the New Jersey 
legislature during the Session which will 
immediately take place, that their interference 
is necessary, I trust that they would without 
hesitation, provide some mode of converting 
as much ground as may be necessary in this 
partially disposed towards the owner.
     Rhode Island had ceded both title and jurisdiction over the Newport Lighthouse in 
1793—four years before Coxe wrote his letter authorizing his superintendent to obtain the 
“soil” by purchase or condemnation.  Back in 1790 and 1791, when the federal government 
was first attempting to obtain a cession of jurisdiction, there had been some question 
regarding whether the State of Rhode Island actually owned the lighthouse land, which was 
claimed by a Jerathmel Bowers.  VI Syrett 550 (Ellery to Hamilton, dated Aug. 2, 1790); 
VIII Syrett 163, 332 (Ellery to Hamilton, Mar. 7, 1791, and May 9, 1791).  The matter 
appears to have been dropped, for reasons not explained in the historical record.  Coxe 
picked up the matter in 1797, again for reasons that are not clear.  His letter appears to be 
his last word on the subject, and local land records do not reflect a transfer of rights to the 
United States.  However, years later, in 1804, a private transfer of land from a “John 
Bowers” contained exception for “such part and portion thereof as this State or the United 
States have a right or title to….”  The exception apparently refers to the lighthouse land.  
(Correspondence from Mary R. Miner to the author, dated Mar. 17, 2003, containing 
relevant excerpts from the local land evidence book; on file with the author).
149
 William Davies to William Miller, dated Jan. 31, 1802 (National Archives, Wash. 
D.C., RG 26, 17A).  The writ of ad quod damnum was used when land was valued in 
condemnation proceedings.  See Attorney General v. Turpin, 13 Va. 548 (1809) 
(emanation, execution, and return of writ of ad quod damnum automatically divests owner 
of title over land to be valued).
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instance, to public use, without requiring 
more than the just value.150
Significantly, we see that Miller suggests not just that the state could 
clear the path for condemnation, but that the state actually would have the 
power to require the federal government to pay more than “just value.”  
What could possibly be the source of such power?  As we have already 
seen, it is a power that stems directly from the Enclave Clause:  New Jersey 
could require excess compensation as a condition of their consent to cede 
jurisdiction over the land.151
People understood long before the Kohl case that the states’ power 
to withhold consent under the Enclave Clause did not constitute a power to 
prevent federal exercise of the power of eminent domain.152  But as a 
practical matter, the lighthouse administration’s general policy to obtain 
exclusive jurisdiction over all lighthouse lands (a policy established by the 
Lighthouse Act and subsequent congressional lighthouse enactments) gave 
that power to the states.  And it is easy to see how conflation of the takings 
clause with the consent required under the Enclave Clause could occur, 
particularly in arguments by those seeking to limit federal authority.153
150
 William Miller to David Gelston, dated Oct. 20, 1801 (NARA, RG 26, 17A).
151
 When this matter finally did get resolved by the New Jersey legislature, they passed 
a law consenting to purchase of the land, ceding jurisdiction over the land upon such 
purchase, and providing for an appraisement proceeding if the owner and the federal 
government could not come to terms.  N.J., ch. 131 (Mar. 1, 1804).  
152
 In 1808, Jefferson sent a message to Congress informing them of the difficulties the 
executive branch was having carrying out its duties under an act calling for fortification of 
ports and harbors.  The problem, Jefferson said, stemmed from property being held by 
those incapable of consenting to transfer (such as minors) or by those who refuse to 
transfer, “or demand a compensation far beyond the liberal justice allowable in such 
cases.”  In submitting the matter to Congressional consideration, Jefferson pointed them to 
their power to take property with just compensation, and concluded:
I am aware that, as the consent of the legislature of the state to the 
purchase of the site may not, in some instances, have been previously 
obtained, exclusive legislation cannot be exercised therein by Congress 
until that consent is given.  But, in the mean time, it will be held under 
the 
same laws which protect the property of the United States, in the same 
state . . . .
VI House Journal 245-46, Thomas Jefferson to the Senate and House of 
Representatives, March 25, 1808.
153
 The early history of federal “takings” is often described as a process in which states 
condemned land for the federal government.  See William B. Stoebuck, A General Theory 
of Eminent Domain, 47 Wash. L. Rev. 553, 559 n.18 (Aug. 1972); Lawrence Berger, The 
Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain, 57 Ore. L. Rev. 203, 212 (1978).  However, 
as the Baker’s Island episode makes clear, the federal government did at times condemn 
property in its own name—but simply using state-mandated procedures.  See United States 
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Whatever political reasons later prevented the federal government 
from more assertively condemnation powers in the 19th century, the 
lighthouse administration’s early practices under the Enclave Clause should 
not be overlooked.  Whenever the federal government used state-mandated 
condemnation procedures even after the Supreme Court’s Kohl decision, it 
was simply following in the footsteps set a century earlier in Webbs Tavern.     
B.  The Takings Clause in Internal Improvement Debates
Though some Congressmen in the early nineteenth century 
questioned federal takings power, there were also numerous Congressmen 
who did not.154  In fact, three internal improvement resolutions that 
contained explicit recognition of the federal takings power garnered the 
support of almost half of Congress.155  These supporters of the eminent 
domain power seemed to stand on firmer textual ground.  
For instance, some opponents argued that federal takings power 
required state consent.  That’s not a surprising argument, given that issues 
of state consent were inextricably intertwined with broader internal 
improvement questions, such as whether the federal government could build 
a road or canal within the boundaries of an objecting state even if it were 
able to purchase property from private individuals.156  But looking at the 
text of the Constitution, the only potentially relevant provision 
incorporating a “consent” requirement is the Enclave Clause.  And that 
v. Dumplin Isl., 1 Barb. 24 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1847).  In approving the federal government’s 
taking of Baker’s Island, it is difficult to imagine that Tench Coxe would have believed that 
the Massachusetts legislature could have empowered the federal government to do 
something that it was otherwise prohibited from doing under the Constitution.  See Dickey 
v. Maysville, Washington, Paris and Lexington Turnpike Rd. Co., 37 Ky. (7 Dana) 113 
(1838) (if power not delegated to Congress by the Constitution, consent of state could not 
give that power to Congress).
154 See, e.g., 31 Annals of Cong. 1131 (B. Smith), 1169 (Clay), 1193 (Cushman), 1221 
(Simkins), 1235 (Lowndes), 1295 (Mercer) (1818); 5 Reg. Deb. 248 (Strong), 269 (Fort), 
286 (Smith) (1829); 6 Register of Debates 642 (1830)(Hemphill).
155
 32 Annals of Congress 1382-89 (1818); Larson, Internal Improvement at 118.  A 
number of the legislators who spoke out in favor of the takings power came from 
slaveholding states, which suggests that the motivations of nineteenth century debaters on 
the issue are more complicated than present eminent domain historiography allows.  Cf.
Timothy Sandefur, A Natural Rights Perspective on Eminent Domain in California:  A 
Rationale for Meaningful Judicial Scrutiny of “Public Use,” 32 Southwestern Univ. L. Rev. 
569, n.267 (suggesting that Congress limited eminent domain powers to avoid issue of 
whether federal government could free slaves by “taking” them).
156
 31 Annals of Cong. 1135 (1818) (state consent was required for both taking and 
purchase of land).
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clause—as internal improvement debaters pointed out—bore on issues of 
exclusive jurisdiction, not soil.157
Similarly, one Congressman was willing to infer some power from 
the Fifth Amendment, but contended that the power was limited simply to 
times of war when the government has to destroy property or temporarily 
take it for public purposes.158  That is not an unreasonable concept, but 
nothing in the language of the Fifth Amendment limits its operation either 
to personal property or times of war.159  And again, decades earlier two 
Supreme Court justices had already read the clause far more broadly (not to 
mention the more recent views of President Jefferson).
Putting text aside, though, the one thing that eminent domain 
supporters did not have on their side was a wealth of precedent to cite.  One 
member was able to remember one instance of a federal taking involving a 
property owner affected by construction of the Cumberland Road.160
Beyond that, though, all he could say was that the taking of private property 
only appeared “a little novel” to Congress because they were not 
“familiarized with it.”161
Precedent, of course, may not have changed the political outcome.  
But we have already seen how it could affect the Constitutional debate.  
Current historiography assumes that the lack of precedent stems from an 
“original” doubt in the founding era regarding existence of a federal 
eminent domain power.  But that same dominant history  simultaneously 
explains the Fifth Amendment’s wording as resulting from the fact that 
politicians in the 1790s understood the power of eminent domain as 
inhering in the federal government by virtue of its sovereign authority.162
157 Id. at 1239, 1295 (Enclave Clause does not restrain federal power, but rather 
provides a way by which exclusive jurisdiction can be obtained); see also 30 Annals of 
Cong. 890 (1817) (stating that opponents were confusing issue with consent required for 
exclusive jurisdiction).
158
 31 Annals of Cong. 1209 (1818) (Austin).
159 Id. at 1243 (Lowndes, refuting Austin’s argument).  See James W. Ely, Jr., The 
Guardian of Every Other Right 31, 57 (1998) (the Fifth Amendment was both prefigured 
by earlier colonial and state developments, and influenced states to incorporate similar 
protections in their own constitutions); see also Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 (U.S. 1833) 
(rejecting property owner’s claim for compensation under the Fifth Amendment, stemming 
from alleged “taking” by the City of Baltimore, because the Fifth Amendment applied only 
to the federal government, and not to the states). 
160
 40 Annals of Cong. 620 (1823) (Hemphill).
161 Id. at 622.
162 See, supra, note ___; Ellen Paul Frankel, Property Rights and Eminent Domain 77 
(1987) (“eminent domain was uncontroversial, requiring no elaborate justification”).
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Perhaps further research into the handling of all federal land 
acquisitions in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries will show 
what the Baker’s Island episode suggests:  that failure of a strong federal 
eminent domain practice to take hold in the early years of the republic 
stemmed not from interpretive doubts shared by a majority of decision 
makers, but rather from practices understandably generated by the Enclave 
Clause.  Not only does the Enclave Clause empower states to impose 
limitations on the federal government’s acquisition of properties (if 
exclusive jurisdiction is desired, that is), but if the federal government is 
going to obtain state consent in any event, there is doubtless some benefit to 
having the issue of takings ironed out at the same time.163  That, of course, 
could explain why the practice outlived the Kohl decision.
None of the above is intended to suggest that the federal exercise of 
eminent domain power was politically uncontroversial, or that federal 
officials would not have been shy about exercising it.  There is indeed 
evidence that in the early 1800s federal  practice was fairly comfortable 
with the concept of purchasing private land without state consent to 
jurisdiction—a comfort level that apparently did not yet embrace 
compulsory purchases through condemnation.164  The point here is simply 
that whatever accounts for the slow development of federal takings 
precedent, we should not assume (a) that it stems from a genuine 
widespread concern that a fair reading of the Constitution evidences a lack 
of such power; and (b) that any stated nineteenth century doubts on the 
matter are reflective of views held by decision makers in the 1790s. 
The procedure exercised in Baker’s Island was undoubtedly a 
federal taking.  It was not a state taking executed on behalf of the federal 
government.  Neither the repeated use of that procedure, nor its morphing 
into circumstances in which states simply exercised their own eminent 
domain powers on the federal government’s behalf, should in and of 
themselves lead us to conclude that early federal officials doubted their own 
Constitutional powers.  
Unfortunately, though, there is a tendency to view the Constitution 
as muddled until the Supreme Court finally spoke in Kohl.  But the 
163 See United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 351 (1883)(upholding use of state 
procedures in federal taking:  “[F]rom the time of its establishment, [the federal] 
government has been in the habit of using, with the consent of the states, their officers, 
tribunals, and institutions as its agents.  Their use has not been deemed violative of any 
principle or as in any manner derogating from the sovereign authority of federal 
government; but as a matter of convenience and as tending to a great saving of expense”).
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Supreme Court justices were not the only ones to think the issue a clear one.  
A few years earlier, the Michigan Supreme Court, in a decision holding that 
states could not condemn property on behalf of the United States, explained 
that the United States itself “may without question seize the property of 
individuals”—and that doing so was “but an ordinary exercise of the right 
of eminent domain.”165  Decades before that, numerous Congressmen 
believed the same thing.  Did Tench Coxe believe any differently when he 
authorized the taking of land, according to state-approved procedures, back 
in 1797?  
CONCLUSION
The development of Constitutional precedent and the development 
of accepted  meanings of the text do not always go hand in hand.  With the 
birth of the federal lighthouse system, we see that circumstances (the need 
for a fair imposition of a federal tax program) created Commerce Clause 
precedent well before Congress was prepared to accept the potentially broad 
Constitutional construction embodied by the Lighthouse Act of 1789.  On 
the other hand, federal practices related to the Enclave Clause may well 
have slowed development of Takings Clause precedent more than original 
shared understandings of the power would have otherwise dictated.
To the Congress of the early nineteenth century, whether or not 
precedent should dictate Constitutional construction was a matter of debate.  
Earlier 18th century ideas of a customary constitution built upon past 
practices still had rhetorical force.  And though such ideas clearly had their 
detractors, it is difficult to read the internal improvement debates without 
sensing that legislative precedent was moving the meaning of the 
Constitution  regardless of the words and arguments that could be piled up 
to stop it, and regardless of the ultimate results reached in the political 
process.  As one internal improvement foe in Congress recognized with 
great resignation in 1830:  
I will not enter into the discussion of the 
abstract constitutional right of the 
Government to make roads and canals in the 
several States, without the consent of the 
States or the people.  It has been assumed and 
exercised so often, that, until some express 
provision to the contrary shall be made in the 
165
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constitution, it is worse than useless to 
question the power.166
Likewise, the force of negative precedent (the “non-user” of a power) 
could slow Constitutional interpretation, rather than vice versa.  Looking 
back at the historical record, issues of cause and effect are not always clear.  
Did practices such as the taking at Baker’s Island stem from a diminished 
view of federal takings power, or did they simply help solidify that view?  If 
indeed the current historiography is correct that the federal government 
never took property without state assistance until the 1870s,167 the historical 
evidence from the lighthouse administration in the 1790s suggests that the 
generally accepted explanation of that large gap (a nineteenth century belief 
that the federal government lacked eminent domain authority without state 
consent) is either terribly oversimplified or overlooks a historical “break” 
from an earlier, more expansive, understanding of federal power—an 
understanding that got “mistranslated” for later generations by virtue of the 
early practice of obtaining Enclave Clause jurisdictional consent for all 
lighthouse acquisitions.  
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 Given the contemporaneous widely held view that individual states could not 
consensually expand the federal government’s powers under the Constitution, it is difficult 
to see why state consent (or even state procedures) should matter doctrinally.  The 
Massachusetts statute underlying the Baker’s Island taking does not change the fact that the 
federal government itself appropriated private property back in 1797.
